Post-Traumatic Command Disorder: The Psychological Consequences of Barlow's Skedaddle on June 22, 1864

The heart of my most recent book, Lee Besieged: Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive, June 18-July 1, 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2025), lies in Barlow's Skedaddle, which occurred on June 22. (To purchase a copy of that book, please press this link.) That morning the commander of the Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, impatiently ordered II Corps under Maj. Gen. David Bell Birney, to advance westward from Jerusalem Plank Road toward the Weldon Railroad without reference to the movements of VI Corps on II Corps' left. Two of VI Corps' three divisions (Russell's and Wheaton's) had not getten out of the trenches east of Petersburg until the previous night and required food and rest before advancing on II Corps' left.

As a result, II Corps took up a line stretching almost halfway to the Weldon Railroad at a distance of almost a mile from the Petersburg fortifications. At the extreme left of the II Corps line stood three brigades of Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow's division. Two (Moroney's and McDougall's) formed a return facing west. They extend southward from another of Barlow's brigades (Fraser's) at the left of a line composed of four more II Corps brigade. Between the left of Barlow's return and the rear line of II Corps yawned a huge gap. A still larger gap gaped between Barlow's left and VI Corps.

Into the unguarded space to Barlow's left, Brig. Gen. William Mahone of the Army of Northern Virginia led a devastating flank attack. He routed Barlow's three brigades and the four other II Corps brigades on Barlow's right in the front line of the corps. Mahone did this with three brigades and captured about 1,600 prisoners, killing and wounding several hundred others. He also captured four guns, the first admittedly lost by II Corps during the war.

Neither Meade, Birney, nor Barlow completely recovered from Mahone's attack.

Meade had his soldiers spend so much time fortifying their left and rear that in November two of his corps commanders complained that the men remained incompletely trained in infantry tactics. Additional large scale surrenders (July 31--The Crater, August 19--Globe Tavern, September 30--Peebles Farm) supported their view.

Birney remained extremely sensitive about his flanks. On August 15, he moved X Corps (which he then commanded) from Deep Bottom northward to above Fussell's Mill. He could hear firing to his front and right along Charles City Road. The firing so concerned him that he moved too slowly to flank the Confederates out of their position behind Bailey's Creek.  He was worried that the Secessionists would hit his right flank as they had hit his left on June 22.

Barlow suffered from a similar species of post-traumatic stress disorder. On the opening day of Grant's Fourth Offensive, August 14, Barlow had two divisions under his command and orders to proceed from Deep Bottom to the Darbytown Road crossing of Bailey's Creek at Fussell's Mill.  His orders called for him to attack at the crossing with both divisions, leaving his left uncovered on the way to the crossing.

After the devastating flank attack on his left on June 22, Barlow could not bring himself to follow orders. First he committed the Irish Brigade.

Then Barlow employed three more brigades to cover his left: Smyth's, Murphy's, and Crandall's.

Next, instead of striking at Fussell's Mill with the six brigades called for by his orders, Barlow attacked with a single brigade, Broady's.

Finally, after the attack of Broady's brigade failed, Barlow attacked unsuccessfully with another individual brigade, Macy's.

The Darbytown Road crossing of Bailey's Creek remained in Confederate hands as a result of Barlow's obsession with guarding his left against the kind of attack that had routed his men on June 22. 

I described Barlow's deployments on August 14 in my book The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2015). To purchase a copy, please press this link.

"This is military history at its best:" Another stellar review of ""Lee Besieged: Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive, June 18-July 1, 1864"

The Fall 2025 Edition of the Journal of America's Military Past contained the following excellent review by Russelll K. Brown of my most recent book, Lee Besieged: Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive, June 18-July 1, 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2025).  Copies are available by clicking the following link: https://tinyurl.com/msbpzzrz

When Civil War historian Earl J. Hess wrote his book on Union Lt.

Gen. U.S. Grant’s operations around Petersburg, Va., In the Trenches

at Petersburg, in 2010 (reviewed in JAMP 113), he covered Grant’s

Second Offensive in two pages. Author John Horn gives the same 13-

day period 363 pages of text. To be fair, Hess’s objective was to report

on and analyze Civil War trench warfare; the Petersburg Campaign

had not yet devolved to that style of fighting. Horn, a lawyer and

an accomplished historian and fluid writer, examines the two weeks

of the offensive in much closer detail. He has written other books

on the Petersburg Campaign and has additional Civil War-related

contributions to his credit. Grant’s Second Offensive was a move to

outflank the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, led by Gen.

Robert E. Lee, by moving to the west of Petersburg to sever rail

communications and supplies between Richmond-Petersburg and the

rest of the south. It included a cavalry raid intended to further those

goals. The first move was to the Jerusalem Plank Road and the Weldon

Railroad. Having brought the city of Petersburg and its Appomattox

River crossings under Union artillery fire, Grant directed a movement

to the west by two army corps of Maj. Gen. George G. Meade’s Army

of the Potomac on 22 June 1864. The move was poorly coordinated,

resulting in a gap opening between the corps. The Confederate

divisions of Brig. Gen. William Mahone and Maj. Gen. Cadmus M.

Wilcox attacked into the gap, stymying Grant’s offensive and mauling

various northern brigades. More than 1,600 Union troops and an entire

battery of artillery were captured and the two corps were forced to

retreat to their backup positions. Numerous participants blamed one

another for the Union failure but Horn writes, “Confederate flank

attacks . . . accounted for . . . the rout of June 22.” (p. 232)

The cavalry raid of 5,000 men of the divisions of Brig. Gens. James

H. Wilson and August V. Kautz, with Wilson in overall command, was

conducted between 22 and 29 June. The raid was beset with problems

from the start. Despite assurances from the army chief of staff, Maj.

Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, that infantry and other cavalry would

be available for his support and relief, neither of those elements

materialized when Wilson’s foray needed them. The raid got off to a

successful start, destroying some rail facilities and miles of track of the

Weldon line. But it failed in one of its important objectives, destroying

the Staunton River (Roanoke River) bridge, when the Yankees were

held off by an ad hoc organization of militia and local defenders.

Burdened by extreme heat, exhausted men and animals, numerous

wounded, large numbers of escaped slaves, laden with large amounts

of looted property, and pursued by Confederate cavalry, Wilson

now tried to extricate himself. Over the course of several days the

two divisions split up, taking different routes back to their lines. Once

again Mahone’s division intervened, occupying a position at Ream’s

Station, a location intended for rendezvous with Union relief forces.

Ultimately, almost 1,500 of Wilson’s force was killed, wounded, or

captured, a ratio of about 35%. All of the column’s artillery plus

hundreds of wagons and thousands of horses and abandoned small

arms were captured. Perhaps putting a good face on a bad situation,

Grant wrote, “[T]he work done by Wilson and his cavalry is of great

importance.” (p. 332)

Author Horn has written a stellar description of operations around

Petersburg in the last two weeks of June 1864. The text is exhaustively

researched and includes numerous, detailed first-person accounts

that enhance the narrative. Horn’s final chapter is an analysis of the

offensive, what went right and what went wrong. He assesses blame

where he sees it to be appropriate: Meade’s “belated” conformance

with Grant’s advice to form reserves for his infantry movement;

Humphreys’s false assertion that cavalry would be available to

support Wilson’s raid; and Union cavalry commander Maj. Gen. Philip

Sheridan’s “lethargic” movement to support Wilson. Horn’s overall

evaluation is that “Grant’s Second Offensive did little to advance the

prospect of Lincoln’s reelection,” an important consideration in 1964.

(p.361) But despite all the shortcomings through which the offensive

“came practically to nothing,” Horn reminds us that “resilience

remained one of Grant’s principal characteristics.” (pp. 342 and 348)

Hal Jespersen’s superlative maps add to the value of the work.

This is military history at its best.

Thanks Mr. Brown,

John Horn

Some Changes in My Speaking Schedule about "Lee Besieged" (Savas Beatie, 2025) for 2026

I had to change my speaking schedule for 2026, especially for February.

I was going to talk to the American Civil War Round Table (UK) in person in London February 17, but had to convert that to a Zoom meeting on March 12,March 7, 2026. I'll be talking about Barlow's Skedaddle, June 22, 1864, the critical event of the battle of Jerusalem Plank Road (June 21-24, 1864) as well as of Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive, June 18-July 1, 1864.  To register, please click the following link: https://www.acwrt.org.uk/event-details/barlows-skedaddle, (If necessary, hit the link again on the redirect page that comes up.) The battle forms the heart of my most recent book, Lee Besieged: Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive, June 18-July 1, 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2025). The book has received excellent reviews and is available for purchase by clicking the link that follows: https://tinyurl.com/msbpzzrz  (If necessary, hit the link again on the redirect page that comes up.) 

Likewise, I was going to talk to Old Balcy Civil War Round Table (Philadelphia, PA) in person on February 12 but had to convert that to a Zoom meeting on March 12, 2026. Again, I'll be talking about Barlow's Skedaddle at the battle of Jerusalem Plank Road on June 22, 1864.

On July 21, 2026, I'll be talking in person about Lee Besieged at the Lincoln-Davis Civil War Table in Alsip, Illinois. This time I'll be talking about the Wilson-Kautz Raid, the other main component of Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive.  

On August 27, 2026, I'll be talking about Lee Besieged in person at the South Suburban Civil War Round Table in Mokena, Illlinois. On this occasion I'll be talking again about Barlow's Skedaddle and the battle of Jerudalem Plank Road, the main event of Lee Besieged.

Another Positive Review of "Lee Besieged," this one by Robert Fugate of American CWRT of London and Atlanta CWRT

Robert Fugate of American CWRT of London and Atlanta CWRT wrote the following positive review of my most recent book, Lee Besieged: Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive, June 18-July 1, 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2025). Copies of the book are available by clicking repeatedly at https://tinyurl.com/msbpzzrz

Lee Besieged: Grant’s Second Petersburg Offensive, June 18 – July 1, 1864 by John Horn

• webmasteracwrtuk
• 21 hours ago
• 3 min read

Lee Besieged is a recently released study of Grant’s Second Petersburg Offensive, an effort to extend the Union infantry’s envelopment of the city south-westward to further restrict Lee’s railroad communications and supply lines, paired with the Wilson-Kautz cavalry raid farther west to hit key bridges and rail lines south and southwest of Petersburg.  John Horn is becoming a Petersburg specialist at the tactical level, having previously written The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 and The Petersburg Regiment.  His new Lee Besieged book makes a good micro-level companion to A. Wilson Greene’s A Campaign of Giants, a massive operational level history of the Petersburg Campaign, with the second of three volumes having been released this year.

The writing here is focused on the regimental, brigade, and division level.  The perspectives of Lee, Beauregard, Grant, and Meade are included but relatively briefly, to provide a framework for the on-the-ground action that Horn covers.  Most of the Army of the Potomac mid-level leadership in the Second and Sixth Corps shows poorly, reflecting the exhaustion of the rank and file and demonstrating a lack of prudence on defense and a lack of initiative on offense.  Solid officers like Francis Barlow and John Gibbon at the division level score badly at the First Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road, and John Gibbon has two of his brigade commanders relieved and placed under arrest. 

On the other hand, strong Confederate leadership enables William Mahone’s division to sweep the field, inflicting heavily disproportionate casualties while attacking, due to Mahone’s personal reconnaissance and deft handling of his brigades.  One wonders that the Confederate troops could achieve what they did, while outnumbered; they certainly must have been at least as exhausted as their Union counterparts from the seven weeks of continuous fighting that preceded these actions.  Mahone is well served by his brigadiers and by Captain Victor Girardey of his staff, who plays a significant role in the battle, which is just prior to his promotion all the way to brigadier general.  Unfortunately for the Southerners, A.P. Hill misunderstands Mahone’s proposed plan of battle and misdirects Cadmus Wilcox’s attack, which means that the battle’s results are less than Mahone had envisaged; Wilcox’s tentative approach leads his brigadiers to charge him with cowardice and request that he be replaced. 

While the book is detailed on the combat, I would have liked to know more about this command controversy. 

Turning to the cavalry side, the Confederate forces similarly far outperform their Union counterparts.  The first example is Rufus Barringer’s brigade holding off Barlow’s division on the first day of the Jerusalem Plank Road, prior to Mahone’s devastating attack the next day.  When the Wilson-Kautz Raid gets underway, Rooney Lee’s cavalry, including Barringer, track them, assailing their rear.  The hapless raiders get stopped before a key railroad bridge by a scratch force of convalescents and reservists under a captain.  They carry out several days of destruction of both public and private property and continue without rest and on short rations.  Wilson tries to lead them back to Union lines but is ambushed at First Reams Station by Mahone’s infantry and Fitz Lee’s cavalry.  Kautz is bloodied by Wade Hampton’s column at Sappony Church.  After suffering major losses, most of whom were taken prisoner, a remnant of the raiders limp into Union lines, not having received the support from Meade’s infantry or Sheridan’s cavalry that Wilson had been promised before the raid.

Against the backdrop of all this activity in the field, Lincoln decides to make a surprise visit to see Grant.  Ben Butler’s ineffectual efforts to encourage cheering from troops whose enlistment was expiring provides some comic relief.  Horn provides a greater focus on the Union than on the Confederate high command.  This may be due to a lack of commensurate source material, but I felt that more focus on the Confederate army and corps leadership was needed to balance the narrative. 

Horn’s deep research provides vivid anecdotes and detail, giving the reader a real sense of what was happening and why at a human level.  In addition to the flow of events, the book also includes solid analysis of numbers involved and the important details of losses.  The text is complemented by forty maps and an order of battle appendix as well as a summary assessment of what was achieved or not and who performed well or didn’t.  The Petersburg Campaign deserves more studies like this, and fortunately for us, there are a number of similar topics for Mr. Horn to address over the course of the campaign. 

Robert Fugate
Thanks Bob!

My Zoom Talk at Civil Warriors CWRT on Dec. 10 Will Be about Barlow's Skedaddle and the Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road

You're invited to the next meeting of the Civil Warriors CWRT via Zoom.  The meeting will be on Wednesday, December 10, at 7PM Pacific time.

I'll be the speaker for that night's meeting and I'll cover a topic from my most recent book, Lee Besieged: Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive, June 18-July 1, 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2025). Copies of the book are available from Savas Beatie by clicking on this link.

The topic of my talk will be "Barlow's Skedaddle and the Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road," which is at the heart of Lee Besieged.  The talk focuses on the clash Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow of the Federal II Corps and Brig. Gen. William Mahone of the Army of Northern Virginia.  Barlow and Mahone had undergone their baptisms of fire in the Peninsula Campaign in 1862.  On that occasion, Barlow defeated Mahone.  In 1864 their meeting ended differently.

William Mahone and Francis C. Barlow

Be sure to log on to the meeting a few minutes early.  If you have any questions, contact me at johnedwardhorn@gmail.com or the Civil Warriors CWRT at cwrtsfv@gmail.com.

On October 22, I'll Address the Dupuy Institute Conference on Fighting Effectiveness in Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive

At 9:00 A.M. on October 22, I'll address in person the Dupuy Institute's Fourth Historical Analysis Conference on fighting effectiveness in Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive, which I covered in my most recent book, Lee Besieged: Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive, June 18-July 1, 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2025). The conference will take place from October 21 through October 23 at 1934 Old Gallows Road in Tysons Corner, Virginia.

The Dupuy Institute is dedicated to scholarly research and analysis of historical data related to armed conflict. The Institute provides historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military campaigns. In an effort to pursue the goals of Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, who wrote many books including books on the American Civil War, the Institute amasses historical data and strivees to refine understanding of the complexities of modern warfare. The Institute is committed to the accumulation of recorded, detailed data from actual battlefield experience and the utilization of actual battlefield experience to understand all dimensions of combat, including technological and human factors. 

I am going to compare Dupuy's method for measuring combat effectiveness set forth in his book, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1977), with the standard work on combat effectiveness in our Civil War, Thomas L. Livermore's Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America, 1861-1865 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1901).

The results of both methods of measuring fighting effectiveness, on page 368 of Lee Besieged, turn out to be very similar. For a copy of Lee Besieged, please click on this link and then what appears afterward.

I will also explain my modifications to the two methods to measure the fighting effectiveness of the combatants during Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive. I include include prisoners as if they were dead. Prisoners were as good as dead during the critical campaign of 1864 because the Union and Confederacy were not exchanging them during that period as they had before and would afterward.

 

Posting a Review of "Lee Besieged" and My Other Books on Amazon.com

Recently a reader reported difficulty posting on amazon.com a review of my latest book, Lee Besieged: Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive, June 18-July 1, 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2025).  

I took a look and posting such a review required an inordinate number of clicks.  I sent him a link to the appropriate place on anazon.com to post a review.  

If any of you have a review that you want to post about Lee Besieged, plcase click on this link and what then appears until you reach the page for "write a customer review." 

Anyone who wants a copy of this book should click on this link and on what then appears until you get to Savas Beatie's page on the book.

If any of you have a review that you want to post for The Petersburg Regiment in the Civil War: A History of the 12th Virginia Infantry from John Brown's Hanging to Appomattox, 1859-1865 (Savas Beatie, 2019), winner of the 2019 Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award for Unit History, 

If any of you have a review that you want to post about The Petersburg Regiment, please click on this link and what then appears until you reach the page for "write a customer review."

Anyone who wants a copy of this book should click on this link and on what then appears until you get to Savas Beatie's page on the book.

If any of you have a review that you want to post about The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2015) please click on this link and what then appears until you reach the page for "write a customer review."  This book was previously published as The Destruction of the Weldon Railroad... (H. E. Howard, 1991). 

Anyone who wants a copy of this book should click on this link and on what then appears until you get to Savas Beatie's page on the book.

Thanks!

John Horn