[As I prepare to rewrite The Petersburg Campaign, I will review the books I must read or re-read to do the job right.]
Recently, in a series of entries in my
blog, petersburgcampaign.blogspot.com, I suggested a
number of strategies for we amateur historians to employ to add value to our
work. One strategy I
suggested was narrowing the focus of a book to the point where its author could
more easily research his topic as exhaustively as the standard setter for
research, Dr. Richard Sommers, researched his masterwork, Richmond Redeemed. An example of this strategy I gave was A Melancholy Affair at the Weldon
Railroad: The Vermont
Brigade, June 23, 1864, by David Faris Cross.
When Dr. Cross’s book was published in
2003, the dust jacket contained a blurb from me: “…the definitive account of the
Vermont Brigade’s disaster on June 23, 1864…will provide a solid foundation for
more general historians. The
story of the vicissitudes of the Vermonters in Confederate captivity is
particularly enlightening.”
I can still say the same. Dr. Cross’s book recounts the disaster
that befell the Vermont Brigade of the Army of the Potomac’s VI Corps on June
23, 1864, at the hands of Maj. Gen. William Mahone’s division of the Army of
Northern Virginia. The book
contains helpful maps of the action involved, some sketches by participants,
and a frontispiece based on a U.S. Geological survey map of the contested
ground. There are numerous
pictures of individual soldiers, as one would expect in a history focused on a
portion of a single brigade.
Dr. Cross
methodically depicts the malaise that afflicted the Union command structure
that day, one day after the Army of the Potomac’s II Corps had met with a
catastrophe several times bigger at Mahone’s hands. The book moves from strength to
strength. After recounting
the fiasco, Dr. Cross follows Mahone’s victims as they made their way to
Andersonville, where an unusually high proportion perished. A physician, Dr. Cross examines the
mixture of medical incompetence, official indifference and public hostility
that led to the deaths of so many prisoners. He analyzes the humbug put forth by
the official historian of Vermont’s soldiers to make it possible for one of the
officers most responsible for the disaster to be elected governor of Vermont
many years after the war. Then
Dr. Cross goes on to allocate blame.
I do not agree with all of Dr. Cross’s
conclusions. He thinks the
Federals ought to have defeated the heavily outnumbered Mahone on June 23,
1864. I think that
conclusion excessively optimistic. In
the first place, the commander of VI Corps did not know that he faced a single
division rather than an entire corps. Secondly,
a Confederate flanking maneuver had routed II Corps the day before. This made the VI Corps commander very
uneasy about his flanks. Expecting
VI Corps to have defeated Mahone that day strikes me as similar to expecting a
swimmer to defeat a shark. Mahone,
a former railroad engineer, knew the ground around Petersburg as well as any
man alive. The Federals
scarcely knew that ground at all. This
is not to say that Mahone could not have been defeated. He was not invincible. He met with defeat at Globe Tavern on
August 21, 1864, as the result of inadequate reconnaissance. Hie was roughly handled at Burgess
Mill on October 27, 1864, when he charged into themidst of II Corps, which was
well positioned to counterattack, and did so very effectively. About the most that could be expected on June 23, 1864, would have been for VI Corps to support its
pickets and possibly inflict a minor defeat on Mahone as he attempted to
encircle them.
Dr. Cross also thinks that Mahone did
not perform well that day in comparison with the Federals, given the higher
percentage of his casualties compared with theirs. I think that Dr. Cross has not looked
at this from the proper perspective. When
about 6,000 soldiers with the disadvantage of fighting on the offensive inflict
588 casualties on around 12,000 opponents (counting only the two divisions of
VI Corps involved—Dr. Cross uses all three divisions of VI Corps and about 18,000
opponents which only makes the matter worse) at a cost
of 152 to themselves, they have achieved a very troubling superiority in combat
efficiency of about eight to one (twelve to one if there were 18,000 opponents)
without even adjusting by a factor of 1.4 for the hasty defensive advantage of
their opponents. The
adjustment gives a combat efficiency of about eleven to one (seventeen to one
if there were 18,000 opponents). This
is a differential in combat efficiency that the statistical work of T. N. Dupuy
in A Genius for War finds only on World War I’s Eastern Front. Confederates hardly ever attained such
an advantage over their foes. Its
significance here is that Grant’s army, at this point, was completely used
up. Almost four weeks
passed before he launched his next offensive of the campaign.
Disagreeing with a couple of Dr.
Cross’s conclusions, however, does not mean that he has produced any less of a
definitive account of the Vermont Brigade’s horrific experience. He has done an excellent job of laying
the facts out for the reader to draw his own conclusions. This book is not just a good
book. It is an exemplary book. It belongs on the shelf of every
student of the Petersburg Campaign.