Lt. Gen. Jubal Anderson Early
Library of Congress
The Shenandoah and Petersburg Campaigns are very, very closely related. Scott C. Patchen's Shenandoah Summer filled me in on the interval in the Shenandoah Campaign between Early's attack on Washington and his second thrust beyond the Potomac, which precipitated the crisis of the war. This was the period in the Shenandoah Campaign about which I knew the least.
The book is more detailed than Vandiver's Jubal's Raid. Patchan begins with a curious statement. He holds that the deployment of Early's forces to the Shenandoah Valley assured that the Confederates could not afford to reinforce the Army of Tennessee.
I had entertained similar thoughts for a while, but Early was sent to the Shenandoah after the Army of Tennessee had given up the Dalton positionin Georgia and before it reached the Kennesaw Mountain line. Early was sent to the Valley in mid-June 1864 because Hunter threatened the important supply center of Lynchburg. Everyone knows that the Shenandoah pointed toward the North's vitals--Washington, Baltimore and Philadelphia. Most forget that while it led away from Richmond, it pointed at Lynchburg, without which Richmond may well have fallen.
If the Army of Tennessee in June required more reinforcements than it had received in May, they had to come from somewhere other than Virginia. This was not the autumn of 1863, when the Virginia armies of both sides were relatively inactive at the time of Chattanooga's fall. It was the late spring of 1864, when both sides had all their Virginia forces engaged.
Patchan points out that the Federals could more easily lose than win the war in the Shenandoah. Early's victory at the second battle of Kernstown on July 24, 1864--the last major Southern victory in the Valley--distracted from Sherman's late July victories around Atlanta. It also opened the way for his men to cross the Potomac for the last time and precipitate the war's crisis by burning Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.
The book observes that after Breckenridge's victory at New Market on May 15, Lee encouraged him to pursue the defeated Unionists into Maryland. Breckenridge chose the other option offered by Lee, joining the Army of Northern Virginia near Cold Harbor, leaving a May thrust northward an intriguing might-have-been, though Breckenridge's forces were not big enought to create an alarm as loud as Early's.
Patchan calls attention to Confederate defeats as well as victories. Major General Stephen Dodson Ramseur comes off particularly poorly for his defeat at Rutherford's Farm on June 20, which he would have avoided had he simply followed Early's orders to remain on the defensive.
The Rebel victory at second Kernstown and the burning of Chambersburg stole the lustre of Sherman's victories in Georgia and brought on the crisis of the war. Lincoln passed this test, deciding with Grant to reorganize the four Union departments sharing the Shenandoah and ultimately put Sheridan in charge there. They rose to the occasion of Early's success much as Lee had earlier risen to the occasion of Hunter's success.
Ruins of Chambersburg
Library of Congress
Patchan concludes with a summary of subsequent action in the Valley covered in more detail in other works. Of principal interest is his analysis of Early's misunderstanding of Sheridan's cautiousness in the Shenandoah. Little Phil understood the damage a Confederate victory there could do. Early mistakenly thought he had to drive the Northerners from the Valley when merely defeating them would distract from Federal progress elsewhere.
The detailed coverage of the critical period in question more than justifies reading this book.
