This book (Jeffrey Wert's From Winchester to Cedar Creek) covers the period after the burning of Chambersburg. It begins with the continuing shift of Federal forces from Petersburg to the Shenandoah Valley and Grant's reorganization of the four United States departments there into one. Like Hunter had succeeded only too well in drawing Early's corps away from the Army of Northern Virginia to save Lynchburg, so Early had succeeded only too well in drawing two infantry and one cavalry corps from Grant's army group at Petersburg to save Washington.
Sheridan's Ride
Library of Congress
Curiously, the book does not pay as much attention to the shift of Confederate forces from Petersburg to Early in order to protect him from the Northern buildup opposite him. This, in an abstract sense, was the last time forces from Virginia could have been sent to Georgia. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division was unsuited to rail transportation, but Kershaw's infantry division might have gone. Sending it would have been a bad idea because though Lee could spare it, Early needed it. Furthermore, the situation in Virginia was too active in 1864--unline the inactive posture of both armies there in the fall of 1863, when Kershaw's division had been part of the force sent to Georgia resulting in Chickamauga. As I've written before, any Southern reinforcements for Georgia at this point had to come from elsewhere than Virginia.
But to go a little farther down that rabbit hole, what difference would Kershaw's 3,500 men have made in Georgia in August-September 1864? Who knows how they would have been employed when on August 25, 1864, as the Federals began their final offensive against Atlanta, a brigade of infantry (Baker's) was dispatched to Mobile at the request of the Confederate commander there? OR 38, 5:987; Ibid., 39, 2:796, 854n. The high command appears to have acquiesced in this. OR 39, 5:986. Could anyone rule out the possibility that the Southern leaders might have sent Kershaw's division to Mobile? They seem to have been hellbent in proving wrong Frederick the Great's reported declaration that he who defends everything defends nothing. (I'm going to get back to this bigtime when I write about Castel's and McMurry's books on the Atlanta Campaign, which must also be understood by the student of the Petersburg siege.)
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To return to the Shenandoah. Wert's account of the battle of Opequon Creek/Third Winchester alone is worth the price of his book. The battle was a very near run thing. Both sides made mistakes. Had Early not released Kershaw's division to return to Lee shortly before the battle, the result would probably have been different. Early released Kershaw's division because of Lee's underestimate of the Federal forces facing Early. Underrating his enemy, Early divided his forces. Sheridan sent a significant part of his force down a gorge that Ramseur neglected to block. The outnumbered Confederates put up great resistance before being routed by the overwhelming Federal numbers.
Fisher's Hill followed three days later, another rout described in detail. Though Early retreated far up the Valley, Sheridan did not penetrate as far as Grant would have liked--at least to Gordonsville and Charlottesville. Though a magnetic battlefield commander, Little Phil was a far more cautious strategist than the general-in-chief.
Wert's book also made me aware of my ignorance of the details of the battle of Cedar Creek, one of the Civil War's most dramatic. Patchan seemed to think that Early might have withdrawn from the field with a semblance of victory, but I don't think that idea finds support in the picture Wert paints of a Confederate army very disorganized by the morning's success.
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In any event, reading Patchan's and Wert's books impresses on one how closely the Confederates came to victory in the Shenandoah, particulary at Opequon Creek/Third Winchester. Livermore's figures indicate what stiff fights the Southerners put up before Northern numbers overwhelmed them. (Yanks outnumberd Rebs about three to one.) At Opequon Creek, leaving prisoners aside, the 1,000 Federals were hitting 56 Confederates while 1,000 of the latter were hitting 273 of the former. At Cedar Creek, 1,000 Yanks were hitting 60 Rebels while 1,000 of the latter were htting 221 of the former. A victory in the Valley after Atlanta's capture might well have swung some Northern votes toward Little Mac. Probably not enough to change the November election, but who knows? One thing that can always be said of voters is, how quickly they forget!
