The Fall 2025 Edition of the Journal of America's Military Past contained the following excellent review by Russelll K. Brown of my most recent book, Lee Besieged: Grant's Second Petersburg Offensive, June 18-July 1, 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2025). Copies are available by clicking the following link: https://tinyurl.com/msbpzzrz
When Civil War historian Earl J. Hess wrote his book on Union Lt.
Gen. U.S. Grant’s operations around Petersburg, Va., In the Trenches
at Petersburg, in 2010 (reviewed in JAMP 113), he covered Grant’s
Second Offensive in two pages. Author John Horn gives the same 13-
day period 363 pages of text. To be fair, Hess’s objective was to report
on and analyze Civil War trench warfare; the Petersburg Campaign
had not yet devolved to that style of fighting. Horn, a lawyer and
an accomplished historian and fluid writer, examines the two weeks
of the offensive in much closer detail. He has written other books
on the Petersburg Campaign and has additional Civil War-related
contributions to his credit. Grant’s Second Offensive was a move to
outflank the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, led by Gen.
Robert E. Lee, by moving to the west of Petersburg to sever rail
communications and supplies between Richmond-Petersburg and the
rest of the south. It included a cavalry raid intended to further those
goals. The first move was to the Jerusalem Plank Road and the Weldon
Railroad. Having brought the city of Petersburg and its Appomattox
River crossings under Union artillery fire, Grant directed a movement
to the west by two army corps of Maj. Gen. George G. Meade’s Army
of the Potomac on 22 June 1864. The move was poorly coordinated,
resulting in a gap opening between the corps. The Confederate
divisions of Brig. Gen. William Mahone and Maj. Gen. Cadmus M.
Wilcox attacked into the gap, stymying Grant’s offensive and mauling
various northern brigades. More than 1,600 Union troops and an entire
battery of artillery were captured and the two corps were forced to
retreat to their backup positions. Numerous participants blamed one
another for the Union failure but Horn writes, “Confederate flank
attacks . . . accounted for . . . the rout of June 22.” (p. 232)
The cavalry raid of 5,000 men of the divisions of Brig. Gens. James
H. Wilson and August V. Kautz, with Wilson in overall command, was
conducted between 22 and 29 June. The raid was beset with problems
from the start. Despite assurances from the army chief of staff, Maj.
Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, that infantry and other cavalry would
be available for his support and relief, neither of those elements
materialized when Wilson’s foray needed them. The raid got off to a
successful start, destroying some rail facilities and miles of track of the
Weldon line. But it failed in one of its important objectives, destroying
the Staunton River (Roanoke River) bridge, when the Yankees were
held off by an ad hoc organization of militia and local defenders.
Burdened by extreme heat, exhausted men and animals, numerous
wounded, large numbers of escaped slaves, laden with large amounts
of looted property, and pursued by Confederate cavalry, Wilson
now tried to extricate himself. Over the course of several days the
two divisions split up, taking different routes back to their lines. Once
again Mahone’s division intervened, occupying a position at Ream’s
Station, a location intended for rendezvous with Union relief forces.
Ultimately, almost 1,500 of Wilson’s force was killed, wounded, or
captured, a ratio of about 35%. All of the column’s artillery plus
hundreds of wagons and thousands of horses and abandoned small
arms were captured. Perhaps putting a good face on a bad situation,
Grant wrote, “[T]he work done by Wilson and his cavalry is of great
importance.” (p. 332)
Author Horn has written a stellar description of operations around
Petersburg in the last two weeks of June 1864. The text is exhaustively
researched and includes numerous, detailed first-person accounts
that enhance the narrative. Horn’s final chapter is an analysis of the
offensive, what went right and what went wrong. He assesses blame
where he sees it to be appropriate: Meade’s “belated” conformance
with Grant’s advice to form reserves for his infantry movement;
Humphreys’s false assertion that cavalry would be available to
support Wilson’s raid; and Union cavalry commander Maj. Gen. Philip
Sheridan’s “lethargic” movement to support Wilson. Horn’s overall
evaluation is that “Grant’s Second Offensive did little to advance the
prospect of Lincoln’s reelection,” an important consideration in 1964.
(p.361) But despite all the shortcomings through which the offensive
“came practically to nothing,” Horn reminds us that “resilience
remained one of Grant’s principal characteristics.” (pp. 342 and 348)
Hal Jespersen’s superlative maps add to the value of the work.
This is military history at its best.
Thanks Mr. Brown,
John Horn
