Dr. Earl Hess has written a book
that better than any other conveys the enormous effort that went into the
fortifications and mining around Petersburg and Richmond and the terrible
suffering that took place in the trenches and mines. This book belongs in the library of anyone
interested in the fighting around those cities in 1864 and 1865.
After most of the offensives or
counteroffensives during the Petersburg-Richmond campaigns of 1864 and 1865
(yes, there were two campaigns, one
for each year, but more on that later), the participants improved or extended
their lines until the final Federal breakthrough on April 2, 1865 ended the
fighting and compelled the Confederates to evacuate.
Dr. Hess makes as good a case for
the use of Ledlie’s division at the Crater as I have ever seen. He perceives that digging precluded training,
and this worked against General Grant.
In making the lines capable of being held by a minimum of men in order
that offensives could be launched on the flanks, he denied the soldiers who
participated in those offensives training that they badly needed.
I disagree with Dr. Hess only on
minor points. The fighting around
Petersburg and Richmond in 1864 and 1865 amounted to the longest and bloodiest
of the war, but it was not the most important of the war. That distinction belongs to the Atlanta
Campaign, which decided the election of 1864 and hence the Campaign of 1864 and
ultimately the war.
I think Dr. Hess’ breakdown of the
offensives mostly acceptable, though for the sake of simplicity I incline to
stick with Dr. Richard Sommers’ breakdown.
Dr. Hess enters the realm of the silly when he designates the Unionist
attack of April 2, 1865 an offensive of its own when it clearly proceeded from
the offensive that General Grant launched on March 29, 1865. One might as well separate the fighting of
August 22-25, 1864, from the preceding fighting of August 14-21.
He is perceptive about General Hancock’s
failure to improve the works at Second Reams Station, but the shooting of the
battery horses there happened after Hancock decided to stay. General Heth arranged the Confederate
artillery, General Wilcox the infantry.
Dr. Hess mentions only in passing
the Secessionist naval foray aimed at City Point January 23-24, 1865. He appears unaware of the seemingly connected
march of Mahone’s Division toward Hicksford and Weldon.
Dr. Hess seems to think Petersburg
was not besieged because the investment was incomplete, but history’s most
famous siege (Troy) did not involve a complete investment. He wonders why fortifications were not
employed more often; the answer is that they tended to arise when a fixed point
was threatened or had to be protected—such as Washington, Richmond, Petersburg,
or Atlanta. Where there was room for maneuver,
field works tended to be left behind before they were upgraded to
fortifications.
Mistakenly, Dr. Hess thinks Grant’s
advances of August and September a winning tactic. Had there been world enough and time, such a
tactic would have been winning. But
there were not world enough and time and therefore it was not a winning
tactic. Grant had only until November 8,
1864, the election, to capture Richmond.
He failed to do this and thus lost the Petersburg Campaign of 1864 and
the Virginia Campaign of 1864, though on the national plane he won the Campaign
of 1864 because his subordinate, General Sherman, captured Atlanta.
General Humphreys, whom Dr. Hess
disparages as a historian but whom I value very highly, cleverly named his book
The Virginia Campaign of ‘64 and ’65. By doing so, he did not have to admit that the Federals
lost the Virginia Campaign of 1864. It
looks like one campaign, but the election formed a hurdle that divided it in two.
As I said, however, these
shortcomings are minor. This unique book
is invaluable. Nobody treats the fortifications around Petersburg and Richmond so thoroughly.
