Another Shaky Source, A Maine Diary on Petersburg

Hand written diaries make great sources.  The John F. Sale Diary at the Library of Virginia is an example.  Beware of over-edited diaries.  An example is, Ruth L. Silliker, ed., The Rebel Yell & the Yankee Hurrah:  The Civil War Journal of a Maine Volunteer, Private John W. Haley, 17^th Maine Regiment (Camden, Me.:  Down East Books, 1985.  For starters, the writing is too fine:  "Death filled the air like snowflakes in a winter storm," is one line in the entry on page 175 for June 22, 1864.  Someone might have written that while on the front lines, but I doubt it.  In the entry for the same day on the same page it is said that General DeTrobriand called it or would have called it "von grand skedaddle."  I really doubt that.  DeTrobriand did not return to duty with the 17th Maine's brigade until five days afterward.  He came from New York City, where he had served since the spring.  Furthermore, he would not likely have said, "von grand skedaddle."  That imitates a German accent, and DeTrobriand was a native French speaker.  Finally, the writer sees things he would have been unlikely to see, such as General Barlow washing his feet in a little stream.  There is a witness to that, but I doubt this diarist saw it because the diaries was in the second line and Barlow was hundreds of yards to the north with thick woods in between.  Much of what this diarist says must be taken with a grain of salt.

Petersburg and Atlanta, Castel and McMurry, Part 3

Castel seems satisfied that Sherman's capture of Atlanta settled the November 1864 presidential election in favor of President Abraham Lincoln.  McMurry appears to think that Lincoln would have won anyway.  I agree with Castel, not so much on the basis of his analysis, but because during the fortnight before Atlanta's capture, Lincoln was preparing for defeat.  He circulated his "Blind Memorandum" at a cabinet meeting on August 23, 1864.

Executive Mansion

Washington, Aug. 23, 1864.

This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President elect, as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards. 

LINCOLN

Grant's memoirs indicate that he thought the capture of Atlanta decisive as well.  Despite McMurry's lengthy analysis, I agree with the men on the ground--Grant and Lincoln--that the capture of Atlanta decided the election and hence the war.

Maj. Gen. Francis Channing Barlow

"Fear Was Not in Him," is the title of a collection of his letters.  "The Boy General" is the title of a biography.  Francis Channing Barlow cut as striking a figure as his counterpart, William Mahone, who saw the elephant in opposition to one another on June 1, 1862 at Seven Pines/Fair Oaks--Barlow in charge of the 61st New York and then Howard's brigade of Richardson's division in II Corps after Brig. Gen. O. O. Howard suffered wounds that cost him his right arm, and Mahone in charge of Mahone's brigade.  Barlow liked to wear a plaid lumberjack shirt and carry a cavalryman's saber, the better to whack shirkers on the backside.  His fellow Harvard man, Lt. Col. Theodore Lyman III of the Army of the Potomac's staff, wrote that the boyish looking Barlow seemed like a "highly independent mounted newsboy."  Mahone favored Panama hats and suits tailored out of tent canvas.

Born in 1834, Barlow grew up in Unitarian intellectual circles, studied law at Harvard, and graduated first in his class.  He enlisted in the 12th New York Infantry as a private the day after his marriage and had risen to a lieutenancy by the time his three month enlistment expired.  Then he joined the 61st New York and rose to the rank of colonel by the time the regiment saw combat.  He fought with distinction at Seven Pines/Fair Oaks, Glendale/Fraysers Farm and Malvern Hill.  At Antietam/Sharpsburg he suffered a serious wound.  Shortly after, he was promoted to brigadier general.

Service with IX Corps at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg did not dim his reputation for aggressiveness.  He did not recover from his Gettysburg wound until shortly before the beginning of the Campaign of 1864.  Back with II Corps, he led Richardson's old division in the Wilderness and led the breakthrough at Spotsylvania on May 12, 1864, that nearly destroyed Lee's army.  Barlow fought at Cold Harbor and in the initial assaults at Petersburg.

On June 22, 1864, Barlow did more than any Federal alive to prevent the disaster very unfairly known as "Barlow's Skedaddle," where three brigades under Mahone routed almost seven brigades of II Corps and captured four cannon.  I do not think I treated Barlow fairly in "The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad."  His friend and commander, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, put Barlow in charge of the thrust toward the Confederate flank on August 14, 1864 at Deep Bottom in order that Barlow might win a coveted second star.  Barlow was ill and was mourning the death of his wife, which had occurred about three weeks earlier.  Hancock ought to have put someone else in charge.  Barlow kept trying to return from his illness but finally had to take an extended leave of absence.  He did not return until the Appomattox Campaign, when he led the second division of II Corps.  He probably saw action for the last time on April 7, 1865, at Cumberland Church against Mahone.  Barlow's promotion to major general was confirmed after the war.

By that time, Barlow had resumed his legal career.  He held a number of political offices and steadfastly opposed the corruption of the post-war years.  He was such a straight-arrow that when President Grant sent him to Florida to determine the outcome in that state, Barlow (a Republican) made sure that the votes were counted accurately, determined that the Democrats had won the state, and was thereupon ostracized by his party.  He spent the rest of his life in private practice.  A very impressive fellow.

Atlanta or Petersburg--Which Is the Real Rodney Dangerfield of Civil War Campaigns?

At the beginning of The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864, I called the Petersburg Campaign the Rodney Dangerfield ("I don't get no respect") of Civil War campaigns.  Since then, my search for regimental statistics from the Army of Tennessee (to provide perspective on the Petersburg Regiment, the 12th Virginia Infantry), has taken me west to fights from Belmont and Logan's Crossroads through Nashville and Bentonville.  What I have found suggests to me that Atlanta, not Petersburg, is the real Rodney Dangerfield of Civil War campaigns.

Why do I say that?  The Siege of Petersburg was the longest, bloodiest action of the war.  On the other hand, the siege was indecisive.  The Atlanta Campaign decided the war.  Furthermore, there are probably fewer books on the Atlanta Campaign and its subsidiary fights than on the Siege of Petersburg and the actual battles it comprises.  

More Helpful Repositories

I have been finding the following repositories particularly responsive and helpful:

Alabama Department of Archives and History.

University of Alabama

Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania National Battlefield Park

Duke University

Library of Virginia

Rome-Floyd County Public Library

Augusta-Richmond County Public Library

Connecticut Historical Society

United States Army Heritage Educational Center

On the other hand, queries to the following were like stones thrown down bottomless wells:

Auburn University

University of Virginia

Queries to a couple more places were initially responded to well, but I am waiting to see the final results before allocating praise or blame.

Citations

As I gather material, I come across many documents garnered from National Battlefield Parks.  Many are cited to the respective National Battlefield Park.  This is not an appropriate citation.  Most, if not all, these documents, come from other repositories.  They should be cited to the repository as well as to the National Battlefield Park.  Why?  Things get lost at National Battlefield Parks.  (The names are omitted to protect the guilty.)  Recently, I tried to get from a National Battlefield Park a document cited to it and to nowhere else (i.e., where the National Battlefield Park actually got the document from).  The curator could not find the document.  That is going to put the author who cited the document in a very awkward position.  When others try to find the document at the National Battlefield Park in question, and it is unavailable, what are they going to think?  Does the author have a copy of the document?  How is he going to prove that he did not make it all up?  So when you obtain a document from a National Battlefield Park, make sure you know where it originally came from.  It is more important to cite the original repository than the National Battlefield Park.

Petersburg and Atlanta, Castel and McMurry, Part 2

Another difference of opinion I have with Castel and McMurry about the Atlanta Campaign is on the dissatisfaction they feel about General Sherman's performance.  Sherman maneuvered too much for them and assaulted too little.  He ought to have annihilated Johnston's Army of Tennessee as early as the beginning of the campaign, at Dalton.  Both Castel and McMurry are sure that if General Thomas had been in charge instead of Sherman, "almost surely the Union victory would have been easier, quicker, and more complete."  [Castel, Decision in the West, 565]

Maneuver is as legitimate at tactic as assault and if properly done, it is far less costly.  Castel and McMurry would do well to read Hans Delbruck's history of the art of warfare.  The Civil War was not fought in a silo.  Neither the Petersburg Campaign of 1864 nor the Atlanta Campaign were fought in silos.  European soldiers did not infest the staffs of the major American armies for nothing. They wanted to learn from the conflict.

Frederick the Great, toward the end of his life, admitted that he had fought too much and maneuvered too little.  Compare the casualties in 1864 that Grant's army group suffered with the losses Sherman's army group had.  Sherman operated far more economically.  True, Grant faced a tougher opponent.  But Sherman operated much farther from the nearest port than Grant, with a far more vulnerable supply line.

Sherman won the decisive campaign of the war.  He may not have eliminated the Army of Tennessee.  He should at least have eliminated Hardee's Corps at Jonesborough.  But every commander makes mistakes.  Grant made them.  Caesar made them.  Hannibal made them.  Alexander made them.  Sherman did what had to be done--capture Atlanta before the November election.

Castel and McMurry fail to articulate sufficiently why they think Thomas would have done a better job.  Hood's wrecked Army of Tennessee at Nashville was not Johnson's rejuvenated Army of Tennessee at Dalton.

No victorious general need apologize for having had numerical superiority over his foe.  How many generals have failed to win despite numerical superiority?  One need only look at the Civil War for examples.  Little Mac, John Pope, Ambrose Burnside, Fighting Joe Hooker, Benjamin F. Butler,  "Napoleon" P. Banks, and, yes, Ulysses S. Grant, probably a greater general than Sherman, failed where Sherman succeeded.

Take a look at the statue of Sherman in New York City's Grand Army square.  That's how Sherman's countrymen saw him.  Probably his soldiers, too, and such of Grant's as survived the Overland Campaign and the Siege of Petersburg.

They had good reason to see Sherman that way.