There's construction on Crater Road and this detour will be necessary to negotiate it on my December 26 tour of the three Petersburg battlefields of the Crater (July 30, 1864), Jerusalem Plank Road (June 21, 1864) and Globe Tavern (August 18-21, 1864). George Fickett has volunteered to lead us through this maze.
Map courtesy of George Fickett
On December 26, 2022, I'll lead a free tour of three Petersburg battlefields. The tour will start from the parking lot outside the main visitor center at 10:00 a.m. that day. The park will be open. Maps should be available at the visitor center. My hat will identify me.
John Horn
We'll go first to the Crater, the nearest battlefield. I'll focus on the role in this bloody fight (July 30, 1864) of the 12th Virginia Infantry, the Petersburg Regiment. I depicted that role in The Petersburg Regiment in the Civil War: A History of the 12th Virginia Infantry from John Brown's Hanging to Appomattox, 1859-1865 (Savas Beatie, 2019), which won the 2019 Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award for Unit History. Both sides called for no quarter in that battle.
Map by Hampton Newsome
Next, we'll drive down Crater Road to Flank Road, turn right and follow Birdsong Road to its junction with the old Johnson Road, where Brig. Gen. Rufus Clay "Aunt Nancy" Barringer and his North Carolina Brigade of Cavalry ambushed and defeated Brig. Gen. Francis Channing Barlow's Red Club Division of II Corps, one of the toughest divisions in the United States Army on June 21, 1864, the first day of the battle of Jerusalem Plank Road. I've written of that fight in my virtually completed Grant Besieges Lee at Petersburg: The Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road and the Wilson-Kautz Raid, June 20-July 1, 1864. The Petersburg Regiment became involved in the battle on June 22 and June 23 as the Federal attempt to invest Petersburg from Jerusalem Plank Road to the Appomattox River above the City went from one disaster to another.
Map of Birney's Advance, June 21, 1864, by Hal Jespersen
The battle of Globe Tavern took place in the same area August 18-21, 1864. We'll discuss that battle, which I covered in The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2015) (sesquicentennial edition originally published as The Destruction of the Weldon Railroad (H. E. Howard, Inc., 1991). The focus will be on the Petersburg Regiment, which on August 19 narrowly avoided on the calamity which befell Hagood's brigade on August 21.
Afterward we'll head back to the visitor center where anyone who wants to buy a book should be able to do so. I'll hang around to inscribe books and answer questions before I return to Richmond for dinner with relatives.
Would anyone be interested in a free tour of the Petersburg battlefields on the morning of December 26, 2022? I'll conduct such a tour if there's sufficient interest.
I've written a few books on the siege and I plan to be in Richmond then.
My books include The Petersburg Campaign (1993); The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (2015); and The Petersburg Regiment (2019). The last won the 2019 Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award for Unit History.
The working title of my nearly finished current project is Grant's Siege of Lee at Petersburg: The Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road and the Wilson-Kautz Raid.
My idea is to begin in the main vistor center parking lot of Petersburg National Battlefield Park, proceed to the Crater battlefield (July 30, 1864), then down Crater Road to Birdsong Road and take up the route of Barlow's division to its ambush at the hands of Barringer's cavalry brigade on the Jerusalem Plank Road battlefield (June 21-24, 1864) , and wind up on the Globe Tavern battlefield (August 18-21, 1864 at the monument to Hagood's South Carolina Brigade at Stop One of the Petersburg National Battlefield Western Front Auto Tour on the west side of Halifax Road south of Flank Road. We would then return to the visitor center so nobody gets lost and I could inscribe any book anyone wants to purchase there.
Those interested in the proposed tour should contact me by email (johnedwardhorn@gmail.com), facebook, or my blog at petersburgcampaign.blogspot.com.
John Horn
On December 3, 1863, Gen. Robert E. Lee recommended that President Jefferson F. Davis appoint Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard commander of the Army of Tennessee. OR 29, 2:859. Lieutenant General James Longstreet, Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, former Army of Tennessee chief of staff Brig. Gen. William W. Mackall and Beauregard himself urged, and the general public demanded, however, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's appointment. "To these appeals Davis, much against his inclination, yielded and appointed Johnston to the command of the army." Elsworth Eliot, Jr., West Point in the Confederacy, 184. (Davis's inclination seems to have been General Lee, who appears to have talked the president out of it. OR 29, 2:861.) On December 8, the Richmond Whig advocated the appointment of either Beauregard or Johnston. When Johnston was appointed, Beauregard congratulated him. Eliot, West Point in the Confederacy, 184.
Jefferson F. Davis
Library of Congress
Choosing a commander of the Army of Tennessee was difficult enough for Davis once Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee declined to take command in late 1863. Replacing Johnston once his unacceptable performance became intolerable during the 1864 Atlanta Campaign may well have been just as difficult.
Richard M. McMurry goes into this more thoroughly in Atlanta 1864 than Albert E. Castel in Decision in the West. Dissatisfaction with Johnston's performance began to voice itself as early as May. On June 24, Johnston's friend Senator Louis Wigfall visited Johnston and informed him that Davis was considering replacing him with Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood.
By this time, Beauregard had demonstrated his superiority to Johnston by defeating Butler at Second Drewry's Bluff (May 16) and Grant at Second Petersburg (June 15-18). One might naturally ask why Davis was not considering Beauregard as well as Hood. When Johnston was removed in July 1864, Beauregard hoped to take command of the Army of Tennessee. T. Harry Williams, P. G. T. Beauregard, Napoleon in Gray, 239.
There are at least two reasons why Davis did not consider Beauregard as a replacement for Johnston.
First, Davis appears to have been dissatisfied with Beaurgard's performance in May and June if sniping at the Louisianian by Davis' military advisor Gen. Braxton Bragg was any indication. Bragg complained about Beauregard's abandonment of the Howlett Line opposite Bermuda Hundred in order to concentrate on the defense of Petersburg.
Second, Hood was with the Army of Tennessee while Beauregard was hundreds of miles and several days away; Hood could step into Johnston's shoes much more easily than the Louisianian. Davis did not remove Johnston until July 17. At that point, only Hardee and Hood were under consideration to replace Johnston. The Federals were at the gates of Atlanta. Beauregard could not have arrived in time to take command before action had to be taken against them. Lee thought the pressing circumstances required the appoitment of someone with the Army of Tennessee such as Hood or Hardee and Lee seems to have leaned toward Hardee. Lee did not mention Beauregard in recommending a replacement for Johnston. Castel, Decision in the West, 353.
Beauregard and his partisans were disappointed when command of the Army of Tennessee was given to Hood. It's hard to imagine that Beauregard or Lee would not have defended Atlanta more effectively than Hood. Beauregard and Lee reacted immediately to movements against their flanks (June 21-23, August 18-21). Hood neglected to block the Federals till they were within a mile of his last railroad, forcing him to attack them in entrenchments.
The student of the siege of Petersburg does not need to know as much about 1864's Atlanta Campaign as about that year's Shenandoah Campaign; the latter was far more intimately related to the siege. As far as the Atlanta Campaign is concerned, it is necessary to know that as Grant's second offensive collapsed near June's end, the general-in-chief determined to restricct Federal efforts to Georgia and Virginia and informed Sherman that he needed no longer worry about the Army of Tennessee detaching forces to Lee. By August, with Grant's army stalled in front of Richmond and Sherman's progressing toward Atlanta's last railroad, the general-in-chief worried lest he be ordered to raise the siege of Petersburg in order to deal with matters elsewhere. OR 40, 2:193-194. Grant thought that lifting the siege would permit the foe to concentrate against and defeat Sherman. Ibid. As long as the general-in-chief kept the pressure on Lee in Virginia, any Confederate reinforcement of the Army of Tennessee would have to come from elsewhere.
Still, the student of the siege of Petersburg can contribute more than that to the understanding of 1864's Atlanta Campaign. The contribution will be to the big picture, rather than to the minute details. The first issue on which the student of the Petersburg siege can shed light is on the choice of a commander of the Army of Tennessee before beginning of the campaign of 1864.
Currently, the two major books on the Atlanta Campaign are Albert Castel's Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864 and Richard M. McMurry's Atlanta 1864: Last Chance for the Confederacy.
Castel says that after Gen. Braxton Bragg resigned and senior corps commander Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee declined command, Davis was left with only three choices for a commander of the Army of Tennessee: Gen. Robert E. Lee, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston (upper left, courtesy of National Archives), and Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard (right, courtesy of National Archives). No one could replace Lee as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, Castel explains that appointment of Beauregard would admit that his relief as commander of the Army of Tennessee in 1862 had been a mistake, and that left Johnston. Davis detested both Beauregard and Johnston, and they detested Davis. Castel, Decision in the West, 28-29. Castel's explanation of Johnston's appointment is probably right.
McMurry considers insurmountable the problems Davis would have faced selecting a commander of a subordinate rank rather than a full general. Like Castel, McMurry believes the practical choice boiled down to Beauregard or Johnston, McMurry attempts to justify Davis's choice of Johnston because of Johnston's seniority, his extensive experience in command of a large army, his personal bravery, his modest administrative ability, and his popularity. McMurry, Atlanta 1864, 6-9. Johnston was indeed senior to Beauregard, but the latter also had commanded a large army (after Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston's death), was personally brave, had administrative ability, and was popular.
Siege of Jackson, Mississippi, July 9-17, 1863
The Official Atlas of the Civil War, Plate XLIV, 2
Furthermore, since Johnston's initial victory at First Manassas/First Bull Run, where Beauregard assisted him, Johnston had succeeded neither on offense or on defense. Beauregard and Johnston had both launched unsuccessful attacks, Beauregard at Shiloh (assisting Albert Sidney Johnston) and Joe Johnston at Fair Oaks/Seven Pines. Johnston had failed to defend Jackson and Vicksburg, Mississippi, and Beauregard had failed to defend Corinth, Mississippi, but Beauregard had successfully defended Charleston, South Carolina. Maybe President Davis thought that the results at Charleston would have been the same if Joe Johnston and Beauregard had changed places, but the successful defense of Charleston against a powerful Federal fleet and substantial land forces might have at least suggested what the campaign of 1864 would confirm: Beauregard was a better general than Johnston, much better.
In May 1864, while Joe Johnston was revealing his incompetence by failing to defend Snake Creek Gap against Sherman, Beauregard was successfully attacking Butler at Second Drewry's Bluff (May 16) and driving him back into Bermuda Hundred. In June 1864, while Johnston continued to retreat before Sherman, Beauregard brilliantly defended Petersburg against Grant's first thrust toward the Cockade City (June 15-18). Beauregard's record in May and June 1864 was not perfect--his plan for a counteroffensive on June 24 was faulty--but his record was far better than Joe Johnston's.
Does all this mean that Davis made the wrong decision choosing Johnston instead of Beauregard to command the Army of Tennessee at the beginning of the 1864 campaign?
Only if a 1-1 defense record since First Manassas/First Bull Run outweighed a 0-2 defense record, and then, because of Beauregard's previous dismissal from command of the Army of Tennessee, any error was hardly glaring.
More interestingly, even if selection of Beauregard had benefitted the Army of Tennessee, any such benefit would likely have come at the expense of Petersburg and Richmond.
With Beauregard in charge of the Army of Tennessee, Johnston would have had to take Beauregard's place in the east. Bragg could not trade places with Johnston to take Beauregard's place in the east because Johnston serving as Davis's personal advisor is unthinkable; the two men loathed one another. General Samuel Cooper, the ranking Confederate general, was strictly an administrator.
Does anyone imagine Johnston successfully attacking Butler and driving him away from Richmond and back into Bermuda Hundred? Does anyone imagine Johnston successfully defending Petersburg against Grant? Selection of Beauregard to command the Army of Tennessee at the beginning of the 1864 campaign might well have cost the Confederacy Richmond as early as May.
Davis needed three good generals for the campaign of 1864, but he had only two at that rank.
At 7 p.m. on Tuesday, November 15, 2022, at Lincoln-Davis Civil War Round Table at Country House Restaurant in Alsip, Illinois, I'll present a talk on June 21, 1864, the critical opening day of the battle of Jerusalem Plank Road. On June 21, 1864, Grant's army group began its attempt to invest Lee's army group in Petersburg from the Appomattox River below the city to the Appomattox above. A single brigade of Confederate cavalry successfully stopped one of the hardest-fighting divisions in the Union army from reaching the Weldon Railroad, which cost the Federals the element of surprise and led to a series of debacles over the following eight days that cost the Northerners about 5,000 killed, wounded and captured--mostly captured. .
Federal Advance, June 21, 1864
Because five of the six principal officers (four Federal, two Confederate) were connected with Harvard University, I've facetiously called this day "The Harvard Reunion" and I'll explain why at the meeting on November 15. The winner of the fight graduated from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and was nicknamed "Aunt Nancy."
The presentation will be from chapter two of the nine chapters of my next book, Lee Besieged: Grant's Second Offensive at Petersburg, Jerusalem Plank Road and the Wilson-Kautz Raid, June 20-July 1, 1864.
This book (Jeffrey Wert's From Winchester to Cedar Creek) covers the period after the burning of Chambersburg. It begins with the continuing shift of Federal forces from Petersburg to the Shenandoah Valley and Grant's reorganization of the four United States departments there into one. Like Hunter had succeeded only too well in drawing Early's corps away from the Army of Northern Virginia to save Lynchburg, so Early had succeeded only too well in drawing two infantry and one cavalry corps from Grant's army group at Petersburg to save Washington.
Sheridan's Ride
Library of Congress
Curiously, the book does not pay as much attention to the shift of Confederate forces from Petersburg to Early in order to protect him from the Northern buildup opposite him. This, in an abstract sense, was the last time forces from Virginia could have been sent to Georgia. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division was unsuited to rail transportation, but Kershaw's infantry division might have gone. Sending it would have been a bad idea because though Lee could spare it, Early needed it. Furthermore, the situation in Virginia was too active in 1864--unline the inactive posture of both armies there in the fall of 1863, when Kershaw's division had been part of the force sent to Georgia resulting in Chickamauga. As I've written before, any Southern reinforcements for Georgia at this point had to come from elsewhere than Virginia.
But to go a little farther down that rabbit hole, what difference would Kershaw's 3,500 men have made in Georgia in August-September 1864? Who knows how they would have been employed when on August 25, 1864, as the Federals began their final offensive against Atlanta, a brigade of infantry (Baker's) was dispatched to Mobile at the request of the Confederate commander there? OR 38, 5:987; Ibid., 39, 2:796, 854n. The high command appears to have acquiesced in this. OR 39, 5:986. Could anyone rule out the possibility that the Southern leaders might have sent Kershaw's division to Mobile? They seem to have been hellbent in proving wrong Frederick the Great's reported declaration that he who defends everything defends nothing. (I'm going to get back to this bigtime when I write about Castel's and McMurry's books on the Atlanta Campaign, which must also be understood by the student of the Petersburg siege.)
***
To return to the Shenandoah. Wert's account of the battle of Opequon Creek/Third Winchester alone is worth the price of his book. The battle was a very near run thing. Both sides made mistakes. Had Early not released Kershaw's division to return to Lee shortly before the battle, the result would probably have been different. Early released Kershaw's division because of Lee's underestimate of the Federal forces facing Early. Underrating his enemy, Early divided his forces. Sheridan sent a significant part of his force down a gorge that Ramseur neglected to block. The outnumbered Confederates put up great resistance before being routed by the overwhelming Federal numbers.
Fisher's Hill followed three days later, another rout described in detail. Though Early retreated far up the Valley, Sheridan did not penetrate as far as Grant would have liked--at least to Gordonsville and Charlottesville. Though a magnetic battlefield commander, Little Phil was a far more cautious strategist than the general-in-chief.
Wert's book also made me aware of my ignorance of the details of the battle of Cedar Creek, one of the Civil War's most dramatic. Patchan seemed to think that Early might have withdrawn from the field with a semblance of victory, but I don't think that idea finds support in the picture Wert paints of a Confederate army very disorganized by the morning's success.
***
In any event, reading Patchan's and Wert's books impresses on one how closely the Confederates came to victory in the Shenandoah, particulary at Opequon Creek/Third Winchester. Livermore's figures indicate what stiff fights the Southerners put up before Northern numbers overwhelmed them. (Yanks outnumberd Rebs about three to one.) At Opequon Creek, leaving prisoners aside, the 1,000 Federals were hitting 56 Confederates while 1,000 of the latter were hitting 273 of the former. At Cedar Creek, 1,000 Yanks were hitting 60 Rebels while 1,000 of the latter were htting 221 of the former. A victory in the Valley after Atlanta's capture might well have swung some Northern votes toward Little Mac. Probably not enough to change the November election, but who knows? One thing that can always be said of voters is, how quickly they forget!
