Longstreet Could Not Handle All the Men at His Disposal at Gettysburg on July 3, 1863

Months ago I wrote that Longstreet had more men at his disposal on July 3, 1863 than he employed in Pickett's Charge.  "Longstreet Had Many More than 15,000 Men Available for Pickett's Charge," petersburgcampaign@blogspot.com, July 3, 2019.  In support of this proposition I cited Richard Rollins, “The Second Wave of Pickett’s Charge,” Gettysburg Magazine, No. 18, July 1998, 104-105.  Commitment of Anderson’s entire division with the initial force would have supplied five additional brigades and around 5,000 more men, making the attack force fourteen brigades and from 15,000 to 18,000 men.  Michael J. Armstrong and Steven E. Soderbergh, “Refighting Pickett’s Charge:  mathematical modeling of the Civil War battlefield,” Social Science Quarterly 96, No. 4 (May 14, 2015), 1153-1168.  These numbers would practically have guaranteed a lodgment at the Angle and refuted Longstreet’s assertion that “thirty thousand men was the minimum of force necessary for the work.”  Ibid., 1164; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 386.  Rollins has identified another five brigades and one regiment scheduled for the second wave of Pickett’s Charge from Pender’s and Rodes’ divisions, as well as at least another brigade from McLaws’ division, all of which would have brought the attack column still nearer the 30,000 men Longstreet thought necessary.  Rollins, “The Second Wave of Pickett’s Charge,” 105-107.  Inclusion of these troops would have made Pickett’s Charge even more likely to succeed to some degree--not necessarily a decisive one.

At the time I thought Longstreet simply delayed committing the second wave of Pickett's charge too long, but upon further reflection it seems to me that Union counterbattery fire may have made it impossible for Longstreet to handle all the men at his disposal on July 3 because the counterbattery fire interfered with couriers.  John Horn, "The Petersburg Regiment in the Civil War: A History of the 12th Virginia Infantry from John Brown's Hanging to Appomattox, 1859-1865" (Savas Beatie, 2019), 186.  The account of a courier from the 12th Virginia assigned to Anderson's division supports that view.  Ibid.  Counterbattery fire killed his horse and forced him to deliver his order to the wrong part of the division.  Ibid.  We don't know exactly what order that courier was carrying, but it if was the order for Mahone's, Posey's and Wright's brigades of Anderson's division to advance, it's no wonder that their belated advance was halted almost immediately.  Ibid., 187-188.  If such was the situation, the only way to have committed Anderson's division (or any other unit Rollins has identified as intended for the second wave) reliably would have been to make it part of the first wave.  Maybe the Federal gunners should be credited and Longstreet should not be blamed for the failure of Pickett's Charge.

Courier Robert Randolph Henry in later years

Credit:  Judy Llamas, “Robert Randolph Henry,” findagrave.com, May 25, 2017