Why Has Fighting Dick Anderson Gotten A Pass for Not Leading His Division July 2, 1863?
The soldiers of Anderson's division, Hill's Corps, Army of Northern Virginia rose early on July 2, 1863.
Moving eastward, Mahone’s brigade formed line of battle with its right in an
open field and its left in McMillan’s Woods, a big stand of oak and
hickory. The Virginians faced Ziegler’s
Grove on Cemetery Ridge, which ran southward from Cemetery Hill. Brigadier General William Mahone’s headquarters lay behind the Petersburg Riflemen, on the right of the 12th Virginia, the farthest right of Mahone's five regiments. One
hundred yards in front of Mahone’s brigade, the gunners of Pegram’s battalion
served their pieces behind a low rock wall on Seminary Ridge’s crest. They were engaging the enemy artillery on
Cemetery Ridge. Mahone's soldiers
slept unsoundly, cognizant of nearly everything that took place around
them. They heard the booming of cannon,
the sound of solid shot as it cut through the branches overhead and the cries
of men struck by shell fragments. They felt
the dirt and grit strike them as cannon balls tore up the earth around them, but
still they slept.
Maj. Gen. Richard Heron "Fighting Dick" Anderson
Credit: The Pall Mall Magazine
Early
that afternoon Maj. Gen. Richard Heron "Fighting Dick" Anderson directed four of his division’s five brigades to prepare
to advance one after another from right to left across Emmitsburg Road toward
Cemetery Ridge. He ordered Mahone’s brigade to remain on
Seminary Ridge behind and in support of Pegram’s artillery and the right of
Pender’s division of Hill's Corps. Anderson’s orders implemented General Robert E. Lee’s plan for
an attack on the Federal left. Lee’s
staffers had informed him that the Unionists had left unoccupied Little Round
Top and the southern portion of Cemetery Ridge.
Lee wanted Lt. Gen. James Longstreet to march two of his divisions beyond the enemy left, much as the late Stonewall Jackson
had slipped around the Yankee right at Chancellorsville, then strike the enemy left flank perpendicularly, as
Jackson had struck the Federal right on May 2.
Lee placed Anderson’s division under Longstreet’s orders. It would join the attack as Longstreet’s men
rolled up the enemy line. Pender's division would pitch in after Anderson's division struck. Meanwhile,
Ewell’s Corps would demonstrate against the enemy right.
Lee
did not have the intelligence from his army’s Cavalry Corps that had
facilitated both the formulation and the implementation of the plan for
Jackson’s flank attack at Chancellorsville. Lee's staffers served him poorly, failing to observe that the Yankee left
on Cemetery Ridge did not end near the G. Weikert house, but extended along
Emmitsburg Road to Went’s Peach Orchard, then swung back to Devils’ Den at the
foot of the Round Tops.
Longstreet
and his troops modified Lee's plan twice.
They reversed their march order when they discovered that their initial
route would not take them around the Federal left unobserved. Afterward they adjusted when they found that the
plan did not fit the situation on the Union left. The Northerners held different ground than
Lee’s staffers had reported. These
changes caused substantial delays. Not
until late in the afternoon did Longstreet’s men attack.
Before the time
came for Anderson’s advance, a distraction hobbled his division—the Bliss farm,
lying in the hollow halfway between Seminary Ridge and Cemetery Ridge and to
the 12th’s right front. Northern and
Southern skirmishers had driven each other back and forth across the farm’s
fields all day. Shortly before 4 p.m.,
Anderson decided to seize the farmstead and its massive barn to facilitate his
division’s advance. This task fell to
his Mississippi Brigade, which stood on the right of his Virginians and to the
left of his Georgians, Floridians and Alabamians. The Mississippi Brigade’s pickets
accomplished the mission by 5 p.m. Mahone sent men from the 12th and 16th Virginia of his brigade to support the Mississippians.
Across the field from the Bliss farm lurked Federal
pickets from Gibbon’s and Hays’ divisions of II Corps. Through holes in the sides of the Bliss barn, some Mississippians and Virginians sniped away at Battery B, 1st Rhode Island Light
Artillery, on Cemetery Ridge. This
annoyed the Yankees. A battalion of the
12th New Jersey, as well as elements of the 1st Delaware from Hays’ division and
a company of the 106th Pennsylvania from the Philadelphia or California brigade
of Gibbon’s division, advanced to dislodge the Confederate marksmen at about
5:30 p.m. The Jerseymen and Delawareans
captured the Mississippians and Virginians inside the barn, breaking the Secessionist
picket line, the rest of which withdrew in good
order. The Unionists also retired,
carrying off their prisoners.
The
time for the four brigades from Anderson’s division to advance arrived after
6:20 p.m. The three right brigades charged as
planned. Wilcox’s Alabama Brigade attacked first,
followed by Lang’s Florida Brigade, then Wright’s Georgia Brigade. The advance of Anderson’s division broke down
with Posey’s Mississippi Brigade, which had spent itself in the skirmishing on
the Bliss farm. To the Mississippians’
left, Mahone’s Virginians remained on McPherson’s Ridge in support of Pegram’s
guns and the right of Pender's division.
Against stiffening
resistance Wilcox’s and Lang’s brigades gained the upper reaches of Plum Run
and Wright’s Georgians almost summited Cemetery Ridge. Desperate counterattacks by Federals of II
Corps halted them. Enemy pressure built
upon Wilcox, Lang and Wright to retreat.
Ammunition ran low. Brigadier Generals Ambrose Ransom Wright and Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox sent couriers to Anderson demanding support. The couriers found him and his staffers sitting on their butts in a ravine behind the Mississippi Brigade instead of overseeing the
division’s advance.[7] Rather than lead his division as Hood and McLaws were leading theirs, Anderson dispatched his
aide-de-camp, Capt. Samuel D. Shannon, with orders for Posey’s brigade to send
forward its right—the 19th and 48th Mississippi—on the left of Wright’s
Georgians, and for Mahone to shift to the right and advance on the left of the
two Mississippi regiments.
The
19th and 48th Mississippi charged toward Emmitsburg Road on the left of
Wright’s Georgians. Meanwhile, Shannon
reached Mahone with Anderson’s order to shift to the right and advance. Mahone reacted to this change of plan with
disbelief.
Credit:
National Archives
“No,”
he said, “I have orders from General Anderson himself to remain here.”
Shannon
moved on before Mahone recovered from his astonishment and complied with Anderson’s
order.
Brigadier
General Carnot Posey brought up first the 16th and then the 12th Mississippi to
support the 19th and 48th Mississippi on his right, leaving only a skirmish
line on his left. The Unionists in front
of Posey’s left threatened that flank of his brigade, and Posey sent a courier
to Mahone asking for a regiment to support the Mississippians’ left. The courier arrived after Mahone received the
order from Anderson to shift to the right and advance, which precluded literal compliance with Posey’s request though the shift provided the support sought. The attack of Posey’s right sputtered. Only a few men from the 19th and 48th
Mississippi reached Emmitsburg Road.
None neared Cemetery Ridge except for a handful from the 48th Mississippi
on the Georgia Brigade’s immediate left.[12]About that time the wounding by shellfire of Maj. Gen. William Dorsey Pender threw his division into confusion. [13]
Mahone’s
brigade left its skirmishers in place. Around dark, the Virginians sidled around 200 yards to the right behind the worm fence
on the crest of Seminary Ridge until the brigade’s right stood behind the left
of Posey’s skirmishers. This put the Virginians
on the left of the body of Posey’s brigade and unmasked the left of Mahone’s
brigade from behind the right of Thomas’ brigade of Pender’s disorganized division. Mahone’s men silently advanced about 400
yards through the Bliss wheat field to the plank fence that separated it from
the Bliss orchard. The Virginians faced
the Brian farm on Cemetery Ridge, between Ziegler’s Grove and the Copse of
Trees. Had they gone forward, they would
have found themselves near Wright’s left, but by this time the Northerners were
repulsing the rest of Anderson’s division as well as Longstreet’s men.
Too
late to assist the rest of their division, the Virginians remained in their
advanced position, where they might participate in another assault—this one
beginning far to their left. East of
Cemetery Hill Ewell converted the demonstration of his corps into an
attack. On Ewell’s far left as twilight
gathered, Johnson’s division seized a toehold on Culp’s Hill. On Johnson’s right at nightfall, Early’s
division broke into the enemy trenches on East Cemetery Hill. Rodes’ division maneuvered to attack West
Cemetery Hill on the right of Early’s division.
Pender’s division, by this time under one of its brigadiers, prepared to advance on the right of
Rodes’ division, toward Cemetery Ridge. Mahone’s
brigade, the only fresh body of Confederates to the right of Pender’s division,
stood where it could join an advance toward Cemetery Ridge.
Secessionist
soldiers gathered around Mahone’s brigade behind the plank fence on the Bliss
farm. On the brigade’s far right, the 12th Virginia’s
men could still see some arrive but only heard the muffled tread of
others. The regiment’s soldiers
suspected they would make a night assault.
They discussed fastening white bandages to their left arms in case their
suspicion proved true. To their right
and front, the fuse of an occasional shell blazed an arc through the sky. The troops felt the order to advance would
come soon.
Before Rodes’
division could get into position, the Federals drove Early’s division from East
Cemetery Hill, leaving Rodes’ division, Pender’s division and Mahone’s brigade without
any reason to advance.
In
front of the plank fence at 10 p.m., Longstreet and Anderson conferred.
“It
would be best not to make the attempt,” Longstreet said. “Let the troops return.”
The
assault column did not disperse for several hours. Mahone’s brigade rejoined its skirmishers
near the center of Lee’s army at 2:30 a.m.
Anderson, Mahone and Posey encountered
controversy soon afterward. Southern newspapers printed
criticisms of the handling of Anderson’s division and Mahone’s and Posey's brigades at
Gettysburg. Anderson, Mahone and Posey fired
off replies. The Virginians’ failure to
support the charge of Wilcox’s, Lang’s and Wright’s brigades on July 2 caused
bitter feelings within Anderson's division and gibes about giving Mahone’s
men wooden weapons and transferring their muskets to soldiers who would fight.
Over the years Mahone has become the principal fall guy for Anderson and has even been accused of insubordination.[17] Ought Mahone to have taken the fall for Anderson, who lay on his rear end behind Posey's brigade while Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws led his division, Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood lost the use of an arm leading his division, and Pender suffered a mortal wound leading his division? If Anderson had remained at the front and personally delivered his second order to Mahone, which contradicted the first, the confusion which arose from a courier delivering the second order may well not have arisen and Longstreet's attack may not have broken down at that point.
Was the criticism of Posey and Mahone legitimate? Under the circumstances, it was not. So why has Anderson, when he should have been leading his division like his fellow division commanders, gotten a pass for lying on his ass? Almost certainly because after the war Mahone, like Longstreet, aligned himself with Republicans and was viewed as a traitor by the Democrat Establishment, though not his men. That put a target on Mahone's back which Anderson did not have on his. Though a good brigadier, Anderson had risen beyond his level of competence as a division commander. Mahone, on the other hand, noted primarily as a disciplinarian as a brigadier, rose to become one of the war's premier division commanders, a mainstay of the defense of Petersburg. Posey largely escaped the postwar controversy by being mortally wounded at Bristoe Station on October 14, 1863, and dying November 13, 1863.[18]
