The late Edwin C. Bearss, kindly reading one of my manuscripts, once commented that Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill embodied the Peter Principle in the Army of Northern Virginia.
Hill, an outstanding division leader, was a poor corps commander from the start. At Gettysburg, he probably bore most of the responsibility for the breakdown of Gen. Robert E. Lee's en echelon attack against the Federals on Cemetery Ridge on July 2, 1863. See "The Myth that Mahone's Brigade Did Not Move on July 2, 1863," Gettysburg Magazine, July 2021.
On October 14, at Bristoe Station, he flung his troops into an ambush by United States troops concealed by a railroad cut and suffered a costly repulse. Lee responded to Hill's excuses by saying, "Well, well general, bury these poor men and let us say no more about it."
Map by Hampton Newsome
In the Wilderness on the morning of May 6, 1864, the two divisions of his corps present collapsed after he failed to straighten and improve his line the previous evening.
At Jericho Mills on May 23, at the beginning of the battle of the North Anna River, Hill attacked piecemeal and suffered a repulse. "General Hill, why did you let those people cross here?" asked Lee. "Why didn't you throw your whole force on them and drive them back as Jackson would have done?"
A bright spot in Hill's career as a corps leader occurred on June 3 at Cold Harbor, when he counterattacked and drove back Federals who had pierced his line.
Hill's performance during the siege of Petersburg did not represent an improvement over his previous achievements in corps command.
On June 22, he misunderstood the plan proposed by Brig. Gen. William Mahone, a Petersburg and former railroad president particularly familiar with the ground around Petersburg. Hill ordered Maj. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, who was supposed to cooperate with Mahone, to proceed on a course that led to a mill pond and a morass that so slowed down Wilcox that he arrived too late to assist Mahone in routing the vaunted II Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Wilcox's assistance would have resulted in a bigger haul of Federal prisoners.
On August 21, Hill and Mahone relied on a stale reconnaissance and against a subsequently altered Federal position launched an attack that resulted in heavy casualties at little cost to the foe. See The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2015).
Map by Hampton Newsome
A final low point for Hill occurred on February 8, 1865, during the Apple Jack Raid. Mahone proposed to Hill that part of Hill's Corps march to Hicksford (now Emporia) ahead of a reinforced Federal corps heading southward along the Weldon Railroad, while the remainder of Hill's Corps occupied the route by which the Yanks would have to return to Grant's army group at Petersburg.
“No,” said Hill. “I have orders to go to Belfield.”
The Federals escaped.
“Had General Mahone’s suggestion been accepted by General Hill, the whole of the raiders would have been captured as easy as eating,” concluded one of Mahone's soldiers. See The Petersburg Regiment in the Civil War: A History of the 12th Virginia Infantry from John Brown's Hanging to Appomattox, 1859-1865 (Savas Beatie, 2019).
A great article. Part of me thinks, "Poor AP Hill," but then, he messed up and got his troops killed pointlessly. "Well, well general, bury these poor men and let us say no more about it" might have been letting him off too easy.
ReplyDeleteI always thought that A.P. Hill improved in corps command at Petersburg but this sheds some doubt. Doesn't Hill deserve some credit for winning Second Ream's Station at least?
ReplyDeleteWhat do you think of Hill's performance in other battles of the Siege? Ream's Station, Peebles Farm, Boydton Plank Road, Hatcher's Run, etc
ReplyDelete