The Siege of Petersburg and the Shenandoah Valley, Part I: Dr. Frank E. Vandiver's, "Jubal's Raid."

On this day in 1864, Lt. Gen. Jubal Anderson Early and his reinforced Confederate corps arrived in front of Washington, D.C. 

Brad Schulte, I think, once said that the Civil War was not fought in a silo.

I agree.  I've been nattering at another historian along those lines and am practicing what I preach by reading several books on the Shenandoah Campaign of 1864.  That campaign was more closely linked to the siege of Petersburg than the Atlanta Campaign.  I'll get to the Atlanta Campaign later.

General Early and the Army of the Valley Movements Map

Courtesy of ThomasLegion.com

The first book covering the Shenandoah Campaign of 1864 that I read was Dr. Frank E. Vandiver's Jubal's Raid:  General Early's Famous Attack on Washington in 1864.  This is a short book, written in a distanced style with an occasional quotation.  It was very gracefully written.

It covers the period that I'm writing about, the time of Grant's second offensive at Petersburg, June 20-July 1, 1864.  During this period, General Early had just finished safeguarding the vital supply center of Lynchburg, Virginia from the depredations of Maj. Gen. David "Black Dave" Hunter.  After seeing off Hunter into the Appalachian Mountains of West Virginia, Early turned to attack Washington, DC as Lee had proposed when Early was detached from the Army of Northern Virginia at Cold Harbor on June 12.  From June 20 till July 1 Early's activities were largely unknown to the Federals at Petersburg and had little effect on the fighting there.

Dr. Vandiver points out that Grant had charged Hunter with wrecking and detaining in the Shenandoah.  Hunter "was going "to achieve the best possible objective."  (Page 8.)  He was going to force Lee to detach a whole army corps from Cold Harbor to the Shenandoah.

In diverting Early's Corps from the Army of Northern Virginia to the Valley, Hunter was the victim of his own success.  Though events after Early's swipe at Washington are beyond the scope of Dr. Vandiver's book, those who are aware of the subsequent struggle in the Shenandoah may decide that Early too was ultimately the victim of his own success.  His activities in the Shenandoah diverted five infantry and two cavalry divisions from Grant's army group, compelled Grant to reorganize into one the multiple military departments covering the Shenandoah, and inspired Grant to put in charge a more talented commander than the Federals had previously had in the Valley--Sheridan.  But that was not until August, which is covered in this book's brief Epilogue.

While Early was getting his instructions from Lee, Little Phil was accepting defeat at the hands of Hampton at Trevilian Station.  Dr. Vandiver illuminates what Grant had had in mind for Sheridan and Hunter.  Little Phil was sent west from Cold Harbor prior to Early's departure to divert Lee from Grant's impending crossing of the James, but also destroy the Virginia Central Railroad, unite with Hunter, then with him destroy Lynchburg, wreck the James River Canal and rejoin Grant's army group at Petersburg.  (Page 14.)  The reader can infer that the Shenandoah Valley was a two-way street, not just a gun pointed at Washington, DC.  Substantial Confederate installations were vulnerable to any Federal force penetrating into the Valley's upper end, though that led such a force away from Washington.  The Federals later worried about Early departing from the Shenandoah for Lee's army or even Georgia, but such moves were impossible so long as substantial Union forces remained in the Valley.

Dr. Vandiver seconds a curious comment of Lew Wallace on the Rebel Yell as a "vent to battle passion strangely unlike that of any other of the great fighting Anglo-Saxon families."  (P. 117.)  The Rebel Yell was not an Anglo-Saxon expression, though Anglo-Saxons in the Confederate State Army may have adopted it.  Any Roman legionnaire serving in Britain or Gaul would have recognized this fundamentally Celtic ululation.  There was and is plenty of Celtic blood in the South.

As Dr. Vandiver observes, during June 1864 Grant still worried that the Confederates in a reverse Chickamauga would ship troops from Georgia to Virginia.  (Page 130.)  The Southerners had no thought of such a move.  In August, as some Northerners responded to Early's threats by suggesting that the siege of Petersburg be lifted to defend Washington, Grant took the position that such a development would free the Secessionists to ship troops to Georgia to smash Sherman.

Dr. Vandiver also points out that as Early neared Washington, it became clear that unless help came from the army groups of Grant or Sherman, no trained troops were available to defend the Union's capital.  (Page 139.)

This book's problem is that its block quotations grow longer and longer until one of them gets about two pages long.  (Page 133-135.)  Anything in a block quotation should be pure gold.  The two pages quoted were not pure, and Dr. Vandiver required an editor to reign him in.

In a brief epilogue summarizing events after Early's march to the gates of Washington, Dr. Vandiver thought it amazing that Grant would consider Hunter as well as Sheridan for command of the reorganized military department covering the Shenandoah in August.  (Page 175.)  Maybe Grant had more insight into Hunter and Sheridan than Dr. Vandiver gives Grant credit for.  While Little Phil was unquestionably the better battlefield leader, he was a more cautious strategist than Hunter, who penetrated much farther into the upper Shenandoah.  Hunter reached the gates of Lynchburg, which Sheridan failed to near in 1864 despite crushing victories over Early.

Cartoonist Al Capp caricatured Early as Jubilation T. Cornpone with Cornpone's Disaster, Cornpone's Catastrophe, etc.  But Stonewall Jackson never had to face a battlefield leader such as Sheridan in command of a unified military department in the Shenandoah and overwhelming numbers.