Difficult Predictions About the Past

As I slog toward the completion of my next book, Grant Lays Siege to Lee:  Petersburg, June 20-July 1, 1864, my researcher and I are trying to determine the number of casualties at the battle of Jerusalem Plank Road, June 21-24, 1864 and during the Wilson-Kautz Raid of June 22-July 1, 1864.

Box of Records from 3rd Cavalry Division, Army of the Potomac (National Archives)

We're finding out how difficult predictions about the past are.

Such predictions are called "estimates."

One would think predictions about the past would be easy, but we don't know all that happened in the past, particularly the details.

An example of a prediction about the past that proved difficult was my estimate of casualties in the two brigades from V Corps that participated in the fighting at Jerusalem Plank Road on June 21-23.

I had figures on three of the seven regiments in Sweitzer's brigade of Griffin's division and no figures on any of the five regiments of Dushane's brigade of Ayres' division.  

According to two regimental histories and an official report, one of Sweitzer's seven regiments had lost four men, another five, and the third, seven.  Extrapolating from that information, I figured that Sweitzer's brigade had lost a total of about 37 and that Dushane's brigade had lost around 27.

Luckily, I researched further because my prediction about the past was wrong.  Examining regimentals and state rosters that are available online, I found that Sweitzer's brigade had lost seven on June 21, 21 on June 22, and five on June 23.  I found from a brigade history and a state adjutant general report that Dushane's brigade had lost four on June 22.  The actual total was thus 37 rather than 64, as I had estimated.

My researcher once published ar article estimating the losses of Sanders' and Finegan's brigades at First Reams Station on June 29, 1864, a fight during the Wilson-Kautz Raid, at 140.  Fortunately, Al Young shared his research on Confederate casualties with me.  Al reviews compiled service records (CSRs) to determine casualties.  According to CSRs, Sanders' brigade lost 53 while Finegan's brigade lost 38, a total of 91.  A memoir informed me that Sanders' brigade had lost at least 32 more in the morning as prisoners, but they all were freed by the end of the day.

So don't guestimate, look.  The figures are almost certainly there.  Even the routed, shattered Federal cavalry regiments of the Wilson-Kautz Raid left lists of casualties that made their way into the National Archives and figure in the rosters of those units published by their state adjutant generals.  I'm plodding through the 404 pages of such a roster now!

"Predictions Are Difficult, Especially When They're About the Future"--They're Not Necessarily Easy When They're About the Past, Either.

One might think the above quote comes from Yogi Berra.  The real author was Niels Bohr, a Danish nuclear physicist who worked on the atom bomb.

It sounds silly to talk of predictions about anything but the future, but it's not.  Sometimes predictions about the past are difficult, too.  The following is an example of a prediction about the past.

It concerns the battles of Sappony Church, fought Juue 28-29, 1864, and the first battle of Reams Station, fought June 29, 1864, during the Wilson-Kautz Raid.

Alfred R. Waud, Destruction of Genl. Lee's Lines of Communication in Virginia by Genl. Wilson (LOC)

A reader of the manuscript of my next book, Grant Lays Siege to Lee:  Petersburg, June 18-July 1, 1864, insists on knowing at which of the two battles the Federal casualties occurred.

He thinks it is possible to know this.  

I disagree for the following reasons.

Wilson's division did most, possibly all, the fighting at Sappony Church on June 28.  Any casualties listed for that date in the units of that division, as well as in the units of Kautz's division, belong to the battle of Sappony Church.  

Both divisions, except for Chapman's brigade of Wilson's division, departed Sappony Church for Reams Station (about 10 miles away) during the night of June 28-29.  Any casualties listed for June 29 in Kautz's division or McIntosh's brigade of Wilson's division occurred at or on the way to Reams Station.

Chapman's brigade remained at Sappony Church, where it was routed by Confederate cavalry on June 29.  

If its troopers had all fled in one direction, determining where its casualties occurred on that day--Sappony Church or Reams Station--would still be possible.

What I think makes it impossible to allocate Federal casualties for June 29 for Sappony Church or Reams Station is that some survivors of Chapman's brigade fled to Reams Station, where they suffered additional casualties, and at least some of the state attorney general reports on the casualties of June 29 (Vermont, for example--the 1st Vermont Cavalry belonged to Chapman's brigade) specify only the date and not the place of the death, wounding or capture of the soldier in question.

But we shall see.  

In the days or weeks to come, we'll be going over the state attorney general reports on all the regiments of Chapman's brigade at Sappony Church:  the 3rd Indiana Cavalry (Cos. A-F), the 8th and 22nd New York cavalry regiments, and the 1st Vermont Cavalry (which I think already proves my point because I've gone over that state attorney general report).  

With respect to June 29, we may be going down a rabbit hole.  It's probably impossible to allocate all the Federal casualties for that day and we may have to look at Sappony Church-Reams Station on June 29 as a single battle.  (Livermore, for example, in Numbers and Losses splits up the battle of Jonesboro into two battles of one day each, one for August 31, 1864, and the other for September 1, 1864.)

On the other hand, even if I'm right about June 29, we should be able to determine the Federal casualties for the other days and actions of the Raid, particularly the fights at Black's and Whites/Nottoway Court House/The Grove on June 23, Staunton River Bridge on June 25, and Sappony Church on June 28.

William Waud, General Grant's Campaign - Return of Kautz's Cavalry Expedition from Its Raid in Virginia (LOC)

Dust Jacket Stories: The Petersburg Regiment (2019) and William Crawford Smith

These days I'm finding the creation of this dust jacket very interesting. 

Savas Beatie, 2019

None of the credit for creating it belings to me.  I was at a loss for ideas about a cover because the picture that ought to have been used had already been used to death:  The Battle of the Crater, by John Elder, which depicted the Petersburg Regiment, the 12th Virginia in action at the Battle of the Crater.

The Battle of the Crater, by John Elder

Hampton Newsome, who drew the maps and diagrams for The Petersburg Regiment, had the first idea for the cover of the book--the map that is in the background.  It was Savas Beatie which came up with the idea of putting on the cover the last color bearer of the Petersburg Regiment, Sgt. William Crawford Smith.

 

Courtesy of William Turner

Sergeant Smith was a fascinating fellow.  A native of Petersburg, he had moved to Nashville, Tennessee before the War of the Rebellion.  When the war came, he returned to Petersburg and enlisted in the Petersburg Old Grays, which became the Petersburg Regiment's Company B.  Smith was captured at Crampton's Gap on September 14, 1862.  After his exchange, he returned to the regiment.  An architect, he was engaged in bridging Germanna Ford in late April 1863 when the Federal advance across the Rapidan at Germanna Ford ended construction.  Smith and some of his crew escaped.  (See The Petersburg Regiment, 137-139.)

In 1864 Smith served in the Petersburg Regiment's color guard.  He was nicked in the ankle by a bullet in the Wilderness May 6, 1864.  (The Petersburg Regiment, 234.)  Quickly recovering, he became the regiment's last color bearer on May 12, 1864, when he emerged at Spotsylvania as the only member of the color guard remaining unscathed.  (The Petersburg Regiment, 250-251.)  It is Sergeant Smith who is carrying the regiment's flag on July 30, 1864, in Elder's picture of the battle of the Crater.  (The Petersburg Regiment, 301-304; Elder took the license of having Smith carry the color into the battle on the staff as he repaired it after the battle in which 75 bullets pierced the flag and nine smashed the staff.)

Detail from The Battle of the Crater, by John Elder

Smith was one of two members of the color guard to emerge unscathed from the battle of Globe Tavern on August 19, when the Petersburg Regiment was nearly surrounded and captured by counterattacking IX Corps troops.  (The Petersburg Regiment, 316.)  

Contrary to the claims of some Federals, the Petersburg Regiment's (the 12th Virginia's) flag was not captured at Appomattox.  (See my blog entry of May 6, 2018, "The Last Battle Flag of the Petersburg Regiment."  https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/1505932777465495219/2666614055563829045)  Smith was among the soldiers who tore up the flag and distributed the fragments at Appomattox.  One fragment that survived is of a star in the hands of a soldier's descendant who lived near an Illinois courthouse I used to visit about 30 years ago.

Courtesy of Elise Phillips Atkins

Another soldier carried away in his shoe the portion of the banner that said "12th Va."  That fragment was at Virginia Military Institute's Museum when I wrote The Petersburg Regiment.

Courtesy of Virginia Military Institute Museum

After the war, Smith returned to Nashville and resumed his career as an architect.  For Nashville's 1897 Centennial Exhibition, he built a replica of The Parthenon that still stands.  (My wife and I hope to tour Smith's Parthenon when we attend a legal conference in Nashville next spring.)

Courtesy nashvilleparthenon.com

When the Spanish-American War began, Smith joined the 1st Tennessee Volunteer U. S. Infantry.  He died of a stroke as its colonel in the Philippine Islands in 1899.

Courtesy of Tennessee State Library and Archives

Why the Weldon Railroad Raid Was Grant's Seventh Offensive of the Petersburg Siege

Where does December 1864's Weldon Railroad Raid/Applejack Raid/Hicksford Raid/Belfield Raid/Stony Creek Raid/Nottaway River Raid fit within the siege of Petersburg?

Some consider this raid the siege's seventh offensive, with the eighth involving the battle of Hatcher's Run in February 1865 and the ninth comprising the fighting in late March and early April 1865.

Others pronounce the raid a mere raid and liken it to Trevilian Raid, the Wilson-Kautz Raid, or the Beefsteak Raid.  For them, the seventh offensive took place in February, and the eighth and ninth in late March and early April.

For the following reasons, I say the Weldon Railroad Raid constitutes the seventh offensive of the Petersburg siege.

Grant conceived of the Weldon Railroad Raid as in part a gambit to lure enough Confederates away from Petersburg in pursuit of the raiders to allow him to advance to the South Side Rail Road in their absence.  OR 42, 3:865 (On December 8, he wrote to Meade:  If the enemy send off two divisions after Warren, what is there to prevent completing the investment of Petersburg with your reserve?).

,  He hoped that VI Corps infantry would get back to Petersburg faster than the infantry of Early's Corps so as to facilitate such a move.

OR 42, 1:448

Warren's reinforced corps (broken blue line) was to lure Confederates (broken red line) away from Petersburg.  Humphreys, with elements of his own corps and two others, was to slip behind the pursuing Confederates and finally reach the South Side Rail Road and the Appomattox River above Petersburg.  Its failure to provide the hoped for opportunity has obscured that it was a highly indirect approach to the South Side Rail Road.

VI Corps infantry did not reach Petersburg significantly faster than the infantry of Early's Corps and not enough Confederates appeared to pursue Warren.  Grant and Meade therefor did not take the risk of attempting to reach the South Side Railroad.

J. H. P., "Vermont Cavalry," Windsor (VT) Park, July 16, 1864

 As I get older, I pray more and more often to find things.  “Oh, Lord, please help me find my keys!”  “Oh, Lord, please help me find my glasses.”

Until yesterday I was praying to find something a little different.

While preparing the manuscript of my latest book for publication, one of my newspaper citations troubled me:  “J. H. P., ‘Vermont Cavalry,’ Windsor (VT) Park, July 16, 1864.”  I didn’t recognize the item to which I was citing.  Ordinarily, the citation would begin with the website from which I obtained it, such as beyondthecrater.com, citing…. or csa-railroads.com, citing… or the citation would end with the page and column number if the item came from newspapers.com or chroniclingamerica.com.

In the absence of a website of origin, I looked at newspapers.com and chroniclingamerica.com.  Neither had a newspaper named the Windsor (VT) Park.  Nor did such a newspaper appear on any other website, such as that of the Vermont Historical Society.

I searched the desktop of my current laptop (the one on which I’m writing this) and found nothing corresponding to the article. 

Finally, I searched the desktop of my previous laptop.  The summary of what I quoted from the article  appeared.  That led me to the folder (“1st Vermont Cavalry”) in which I had in May 2019 downloaded individual images of each page of the article before I created my summary of the article.  I searched my emails and downloads for that period and found nothing corresponding.  I think I know who sent me the images of the article, but I haven’t received confirmation.  Therefore I intend to publish the images here in my blog so that somebody looking for my citation can verify it.

The moral of the story is immediately to include any document’s origin whenever it is footnoted.  This article will be cited as posted in johnhorncivilwarauthor.blogspot.com, August 17, 2023.  It has long been in the public domain.

The Battle of Decatur, Georgia, July 22, 1864: A Potentially Decisive Battle?

Late last year I blogged about the Confederacy's lack of enough talented generals to go around during the Campaign of 1864.  I pointed out that even if President Jefferson Davis had heeded the advice of Gen. Robert E. Lee to put Gen. G. T. Beauregard in command of the Army of Tennessee, and even if Beauregard were able to defend Atlanta successfully, the Confederacy would probably have lost Richmond in May or June of 1864.  If Beauregard had taken command of the Army of Tennessee, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston (whom Davis entrusted with the Army of Tennessee) would have had to fill Beauregard's shoes on the east coast.  It is highly unlikely that Johnston would have successfully defended Richmond against both Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler and Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.  To be more specific, it is unthinkable that Johnston would have acted as boldly as Beauregard on the evening of June 15, when to reinforce his troops defending Petersburg he abandoned the Howlett Line keeping Butler from advancing westward from Bermuda Hundred.  No matter how Davis shuffled his generals, he could not deploy them in a way that might win the war.

Was there any other way that the Confederacy might have prevailed?  Yes, but a special case or a miracle would have been required.

I came across evidence suggesting the possibility as I wrote a thumbnail biography of John W. Sprague for a collection of postwar reports to be published in the near future by Savas Beatue.  Sprague had led the 63rd Ohio as its colonel at the battle of Corinth, October 3-4, 1862.  Afterward, he and his mauled regiment performed mostly garrison duty until the beginning of the Campaign of 1864.  Still a colonel, he led a brigade in XVI Corps of the Army of the Tennessee, part of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's army group facing the Confederate Army of Tennessee.

Portrait of Brig. Gen. John W. Sprague, office of the Federal Army (LOC)

On July 22, 1864, the same day as the battle of Atlanta, Sprague's brigade was assigned to guard the trains of the Army of the Tennessee at Decatur, Georgia.  I assumed that those trains comprised about a third of the wagons in Sherman's entire army group because the Army of the Tennessee was smaller than than Army of the Cumberland yet larger than the Army of the Ohio, the army group's other two components.  Confederate cavalry outnumbering Sprague's brigade attacked the trains at Decatur.  Sprague, successfully defended the trains.  He was almost immediatly promoted to brigadier general.  The loss of those trains would have crippled the Army of the Tennessee.  Replacing the wagons, hornses and other equipment via the Western & Atlantic Railroad, Sherman's sole supply line, would have posed a difficult problem.  I reasoned that it might have hindered Sherman's final maneuvers against Atlanta.

The Battles of Atlanta and Decatur, July 22, 1864

mapdatabaseinfo.blogspot.com

A little more research indicated that if Sprague had failed at Decatur on July 22, the results could have been even worse.  The trains of the Army of the Ohio were headed for Decatur as well.  This meant Sherman's army group would have lost not about a third but about half of its trains, as many as 1,600 ordnance and supply wagons and teams.  This almost certainly would have hindered the Army of the Tennessee's move to the west of Atlanta that resulted in the battle of Ezra Church on July 28.  It very likely would have delayed if not prevented the capture of Atlanta prior to the November election.  [David Allison, with chapters contributed by Lisa Rickey and Blaise J. Arena, Attacked on All Sides: The Civil War Battle of Decatur, Georgia, the Untold Story of the Battle of Atlanta (North Charleston, SC:  CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform), 122-124]  If it prevented the capture of Atlanta, it might have prevented the re-election of President Abraham Lincoln.

Nonetheless, it would have been a very special case.  

The Twelfth Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign," Gettysburg Magazine, July 2023, Issue 69

An article of mine, The Twelfth Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign, appears in the current issue of Gettysburg Magazine, July 2023, Issue 69.  The article covers in detail the 12th Virginia, the Petersburg Regiment of Mahone's brigade, Anderson's division, Hill's Corps, from June 14, 1863, when the regiment departed Fredericksburg, through uly 25, 1863, when the 12th pitched camp at Culpeper Court House, Virginia.

The article draws on two of my writings.

First, the article draws on my book, The Petersburg Regiment in the Civil War: A History of the 12th Virginia from John Brown's Hanging to Appomattox, 1859-1865 (Savas Beatie, 2019).  The book won the 2019 Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award for Unit History.  (The distinguished writing was principally by the  soldiers; writings from at least 30 of them are quoted in the book.)

The article also draws on an article of mine, The Myth that Mahone's Brigade Did Not Move on July 2, 1863, Gettysburg Magazine, July 2021, Issue 65.

Map by Hal Jespersen

Please Be on the Lookout for Letters from Victor Jean Baptiste Girardey or his Brothers

If anyone knows where letters of Victor Jean Baptiste Girardey or his brothers Isadore and Camille are located, please let me know.

Currently I'm at work on an article that will contain the little we know about one of the War of the Rebellion's most remarkable officers, Victor Jean Baptiste Girardey.  His brief career provides the only instance in the Confederate States Army of a promotion from captain to brigadier general.  His death at the age of 27 before the Confederate Senate could confirm that promotion deprived the Army of Northern Virginia of his sorely needed leadership.  His outstanding achievements have attracted relatively little attention.  Though he had ties with Georgia, he joined what became an entirely Georgia brigade from a Louisiana unit and served in the Georgia brigade as a staff officer rather than a line officer except for less than two weeks before his death.  Line officers misallocated or disputed credit for some of his most remarkable exploits.  Evidence exists that Girardey, and not the brave but ailing Brig. Gen. Ambrose Ransom "Rans" Wright, led Wright's brigade to the top of Cemetery Ridge on July 2, 1863.

Victor Jean-Baptiste Girardey

Credit:  Francis Trevelyan Miller and Robert S. Lanier, The Photographic History of the Civil War (10 vols.) (New York, 1910), 10:157.

Girardey left letters.  At least one of them was auctioned off by Heritage Auction Galleries in Dallas, Texas, February 20-21, 2006, with The Henry E. Luhrs Collection of Important Manuscripts & Historical Autographs, Manuscripts, and Rare Books.  The letter concerns the battle of the Crater, where Girardey earned his unique promotion by his timing of the Confederate counterattack.  A catalogue of the auction is listed as available on Amazon but the listing is in error and the catalogue is unavailable, as I learned when I tried to purchase a copy.

Map by Hampton Newsome

Gierardey has figured in all my books.  His activity at the battle of Jerusalem Plank Road (June 21-23, 1864) figures in my work-in-progress, Grant Lays Siege to Lee:  Petersburg, June 18-July 1, 1864.  His leadership at the battle of the Crater (July 30, 1864) plays a role in The Petersburg Regiment in the Civil War:  A History of the 12th Virginia Infantry from John Brown's Hanging to Appomattox, 1859-1865 (Savas Beatie, 2019), winner of the 2019 Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award for Unit History.  His death  in The Siege of Petersburg:  The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2015).

The current draft of my article on Girardey runs to about 4,000 words, including notes.  If anyone knows of where more of his or his brothers' letters are located, please let me know.  Isadore lived in Augusta, Georgia, and Camille in New Orleans, Louisiana.

The Limits of Grant's Nerve, Upon Mature Reflection

I want to thank all my readers (particularly those on facebook) for their criticism and encouragement about my blog post, "The Limits of Grant's Nerve."  They led me to change my views a little.  There follows what I intend to write about the attitude adjustments Grant and Lee underwent toward one another during 1864 from the Wilderness (May 5-6) through Jerusalem Plank Road (June 21-23):

Grant and Lee underwent attitude adjustments during the 1864 campaign.  They behaved more cautiously than before they had joined battle.  Each had entered the campaign considering the other overrated.  By deceiving Lee at the Mule Shoe and during the James crossing, Grant had convinced the Southern chieftain that he finally faced a foe whose movements he could not predict.  Lee entered Petersburg on June 18 in such a state that he uncharacteristically declined to counterattack the Union left on the spot as Beauregard suggested, but the Virginian’s aggressiveness soon returned. 

By contesting almost every inch of ground from the Rapidan to the Weldon Railroad, he disabused the Federal general-in-chief of the idea that he might maneuver with impunity.  After Grant's defeat in the battle of Jerusalem Plank Road, he declined to cut loose from the City Point bridgehead with the Army of the Potomac to sever Lee’s communications.  Warren had suggested and Grant had considered such a move.[1]  The general-in-chief claimed to want to fight Lee’s army outside its entrenchments, which cutting loose would compel.[2]  Meade and Barnard persuaded Grant that such an operation would be too hazardous.[3] 

The Moment of Truth at the battle of Jerusalem Plank Road, 3:15 p.m., June 21, 1864

Map by Hal Jespersen

Sherman has been criticized for lack of a killer instinct, but he cut loose in late August 1864 from his bridgehead over the Chattahoochee River and forced the Confederates to abandon Atlanta.[4]  Sherman did not face Robert E. Lee and did not have a corps of enemy infantry unaccounted for and possibly poised to pounce on his flank or rear.[5]  Early’s actual location proved even more problematical.  The unknown location of Early’s corps justified the-general-in-chief’s prudence.  Grant chose the right course in not cutting loose. 

Early’s approach to Washington closed the window for cutting loose by drawing off troops necessary for the operation.[6]  The window did not reopen until the troops sent in response to Early’s threat to the capital returned to Petersburg, but that was after Lincoln’s reelection when it was unnecessary to take the risks attendant on cutting loose.[7]

---

[1]OR 40, 1:26, 2:333-334, 477-478.

[2]Porter, Campaigning with Grant, 155.

[3]OR 40, 2:333, 478-479.

[4]Albert E. Castel, Decision in the West:  The Atlanta Campaign of 1864 (Lawrence, KS, 1991), 485-486, 563-565; Richard M. McMurry, Atlanta 1864:  Last Chance for the Confederacy (Lincoln, NE, 2001), 169-171, 182-183.

[5]Castel wrote, “Had Sherman been the one to have gone against Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia in the spring of 1864 (Meade, when Grant visited him in March of that year, assumed that Sherman would be given command of the Army of the Potomac), in all likelihood he would have cracked beneath their terrible hammer blows.”  Castel, Decision in the West, 564.  McMurry wrote, “Neither of [Sherman’s] opponents was an especially able general nor received the wholehearted support of his subordinates.”  McMurry, Atlanta 1864, 182.  Fuller, no partisan of Lee, wrote that Grant was “faced not by a Pemberton or a Bragg, but by Lee, the most renowned general of the day, and to be confronted by a task which had broken McDowell, McClellan, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker, and which had halted Meade.”  Fuller, The Generalship of U. S. Grant, 281 (emphases in original).  Fuller further wrote, “As a general, Lee must stand or fall by his last campaign; for[...], though he won no battle, it was the most skilful, masterful and heroic he was ever engaged in.”  Ibid., 381 (emphasis in original).  This is praise indeed coming from a Britisher so biased against the Virginian as to ignore Lee’s victories at Jerusalem Plank Road and First Reams Station, among others.  Ibid., 445, 448.

[6]OR 40, 3:35-36. 

[7]Ibid., 42, 3:865-867, 891-892.  Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, the apostle of the indirect approach, who championed Sherman over Grant, would probably in principle have approved of cutting loose at some point.  B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York, 1991), 330-333.

The Limits of Grant's Nerve

The Limits of Grant's Nerve,

as Demonstrated in the Period About Which I Am Writing in My Current Book,

Grant Begins His Siege of Lee: Petersburg, June 18-July 1, 1864

Grant was one of our greatest generals, but so was Lee.  Grant was a bold general, but his nerve had its limits, and he displayed them during the siege of Petersburg.  At the beginning of the siege, when he outnumbered Lee two to one, Grant declined to cut loose from his base at Bermuda Hundred as Warren suggested on June 23 to cut Lee's communications, in a move similar to the one Sherman made at Atlanta to cut Hood's last rail line and force the evacuation of that city.  

Two divisions of Confederates had just trounced the Army of the Potomac's II and VI orps on June 22, inflicting about 2,500 casualties at a cost of around 600 to the Rebels.  Warren suggested to Meade on the afternoon June 23 that the Army of the Potomac abandon its lines, send its wagons to the Army of the James in Bermuda Hundred, and set out for the Weldon Railroad with six days’ rations.  Meade passed this idea along to Grant after objecting because it would invite Lee to interpose between the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James, cutting off the former from supplies.  Grant criticized Warren’s plan as insufficiently bold.  “I would not think of moving the whole of your command with less than ten days’ rations, and then it would be to turn the enemy’s right, cross the Appomattox, and force a connection with Butler between Richmond and Petersburg,” the general-in-chief wrote to Meade.  Later the same afternoon, instead of implementing his improvement on Warren's plan, Grant directed Butler to stretch to his left and by morning relieve the right division of IX Corps.  Meanwhile, Warren acknowledged to Meade the risks and objections involved, but observed that the Army of the Potomac could turn about and fight in case the Confederates interposed between it and the Army of the James.  Warren urged "some decisive movement, in which, throwing all our weight into the battle, we are willing to run the risk of losing all by a failure--fight the Wilderness battle again."

On June 28, while Federal troops at Petersburg rested, Grant still contemplated taking the Army of the Potomac with ten days rations to the Appomattox above Petersburg and from there either attacking the Cockade City from that side or crossing the Appomattox and striking the Howlett Line from behind.  Ultimately, the general-in-chief lacked the nerve for such a plan.  He did not dare make such a risky move against Lee, who had contested practically every foot of ground from the Rapidan to the James.  Even at the end of the Petersburg siege, again outnumbering Lee two to one, Grant still declined to cut loose from his base but stretched out to his left a corps at a time and finally overwhelmed Lee by direct assault.

Map by Hal Jespersen

Grant and Lee had undergone attitude adjustments during the Overland Campaign.  They behaved more cautiously during the siege than before they had joined battle.  Each entered the Overland Campaign considering the other overrated.  By deceiving Lee at the Mule Shoe and during the crossing of James River, Grant convinced the Southern chieftain that he finally faced a foe whose movements he could not predict.  Lee entered Petersburg on June 18 in such a state that he uncharacteristically declined to counterattack the Union left on the spot as Beauregard suggested.  On the other hand, the Virginia general by contesting almost every inch of ground from the Rapidan to the James, disabused the Federal general-in-chief of the idea that he might maneuver with impunity.  Grant never cut loose from the City Point bridgehead with the Army of the Potomac to sever Lee’s communications as Warren suggested and the general-in-chief contemplated.  Sherman did cut loose from his Chattahoochee bridgehead at Atlanta, but he did not face Robert E. Lee.

Beauregard and Lee

Friends, forgive me; I had to tweak my blog address once more to conform with my blog's new title and description.  The new blog address is johnhorncivilwarauthor.blogspot.com

Beauregard and Lee

Robert E. Lee, a Virginian, graduated second in the West Point class of 1829.  

Pierre Gustave Toutant "Gus" Beauregard, a Louisianan who as an adult did not use his first name but styled himself "G. T. Beauregard," graduated second in the West Point class of 1838.  

Both served in the United States Army as engineers.  Both served with distinction in the Mexican War.  

Lee distinguished himself as one of the chief aides to his fellow Virginian, Major General Winfield Scott, during the march from Vera Cruz to Mexico City.  Lee's personal reconnaissances contributed to American victories by finding routes of attack undefended by the Mexicans because the terrain appeared impassable.  He fought at Cerro Gordo, Contreras, Cherubusco, and Chapultepec, where he was wounded.  He was breveted major, lieutenant colonel and colonel.

Map of August 18, 1864, by Hampton Newsome, from John Horn, The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2015)

Beauregard served as an engineer on Scott's staff.  He fought at Contreras, Cherubusco and Chapultepec, where he was wounded in two places.  He too carried out reconnaissances.  He also persuaded his superiors to attack the fortress of Chapultepec differently than they had planned.  He was breveted captain and major.

Gus felt slighted, but not with respect to Lee.  Beauregard considered his contributions to victory more significant than those of other officers who received more brevets than he, but not more significant than Lee's contributions.

Both Lee and Beauregard were appointed Superintendent of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point.  

Lee served from 1852 until 1855, when he became lieutenant colonel of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Texas.

Around that time Beauregard exhibited dubious judgment in considering a post filibustering in Nicaragua with William Walker, who had taken control of that country.  Fortunately for Gus, Scott talked him out of the enterprise.  Walker was soon forced to resign the presidency of Nicaragua.

Beauregard was appointed Superintendent of the Military Academy on January 23, 1861.  He relinquished the office after five days because the Federal government revoked his orders as soon as Louisiana seceded.

Both Beauregard and Lee numbered among the Confederacy's five first full generals.  Beauregard ranked fifth, Lee third.

Shortly before First Manassas, Lee participated in the rejection of a complicated, highly optimistic plan of the sort that became typical of Beauregard.

Gus met with success first.  He participated in the victory at First Manassas on July 21, 1861.  Lee met with defeat in a campaign in western Virginia.

Map of August 19, 1864, by Hampton Newsome, from John Horn, The Siege of Petersburg; The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatue, 2015)

Beauregard exhibited a quarrelsome nature.  He contended with the Commissary General, the Secretary of War and finally President Davis.  A political liability, he was packed off to serve as second-in-command to General Albert Sidney Johnston.

Beauregard subsequently rose to command the Army of Tennessee after the death of Johnston at the battle of Shiloh.  Lee soon afterward was appointed to command what became the Army of Northern Virginia after the wounding of General Joseph Eggleston Johnston.  

Lee's star was on the rise, Beauregard's on the wane.  Gus was relieved of command of the Army of Tennessee when he clumsily took sick leave after the fall of Corinth, Mississippi.  Davis packed him off to Charleston, South Carolina.

After Chancellorsville, Lee urged Davis to bring Beauregard and most of his troops up to Virginia from the south Atlantic coast.  While Lee raided Pennsylvania, Beauregard would menace Washington, D.C. and lighten the pressure on Lee.  Gus, who had already dispatched 5,000 men to the attempted relief of Vicksburg, thought the departure of more would invite an enemy attack.

In the last month of 1863, Lee recommended that Davis appoint Beauregard commander of the Army of Tennessee.  Beauregard, among many others, suggested Johnston.  Davis, who seems to have really wanted Lee for the post, appointed Johnston. 

The first real friction between Beauregard and Lee developed in May and June 1864.  The two vied for troops and the Davis administration usually backed Lee.  Grant's crossing of the James intensified the friction between the two Confederate generals.  Some hard feelings developed between the two.

When Johnston was removed from the command of the Army of Tennessee in July 1864, Beauregard hoped to replace him.  Lee did not recommend Beauregard to Davis as a possible replacement for Johnston.  This does not appear to have arisen from the hard feelings between Gus and Lee, but from the urgency of replacing Johnston; Sherman was at the gates of Atlanta by the time Davis sacked Old Joe.  By that time, the replacement had to come from within the Army of Tennessee.  In any event, Davis would never have appointed Beauregard commander of the Army of Tennessee at this point because the president appears to have been dissatisfied with Beaurgard's performance in May and June if sniping at the Louisianian by Davis' military advisor Gen. Braxton Bragg was any indication.  Bragg complained about Beauregard's abandonment of the Howlett Line opposite Bermuda Hundred in order to concentrate on the defense of Petersburg.

Beauregard did not serve Lee at Petersburg as Gus had served Joe Johnston at First Manassas and Albert Sydney Johnston at Shiloh.  Beauregard had done the planning and fighting at those two battles.  At Petersburg, Gus commanded when Lee was north of the James but reverted to command of his own troops, essentially a corps, in Lee's presence.  Lee, who had written off the Weldon Railroad as indefensible upon arriving in Petersburg in June, refused to join the Davis administration in nit-picking Beauregard for the loss of the railway in August.  Gus actually performed better than Lee in the August fighting around Petersburg, counterattacking with what he had before the Federals could dig in (August 18 and 19) rather than waiting like Lee for set piece engagements while the enemy entrenched (August 21).  Beauregard blamed the Davis administration rather than Lee for not giving Gus command of the Confederate forces gathering around Early's Corps in the lower Shenandoah Valley.

Map of August 21, 1864, by Hampton Newsome, from John Horn, The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2015)

In September Lee encouraged Beauregard to leave Petersburg and take command at Wilmington, North Carolina or Charleston.  In the aftermath of Atlanta's fall, Gus hoped for command of the Army of Tennessee but was given an empty command overseeing that army.  

By February 1865, Lee had become general-in-chief of the Confederate States Army.  Unable to understand how Sherman could advance without orthodox supply lines, Lee became dissatisfied with Beauregard's inability to stop Sherman's advance northward from Savannah.  The general-in-chief removed Beaurgard and replaced him with Johnston, who brought Sherman to battle at Bentonville in March but did not stop his progress north.

After the war Beauregard praised Lee for "great nerve, coolness, & determination--the greater the danger the greater was his presence of mind" and his noble & high toned character."  Gus also criticised Lee, writing that Lee did not have "much Mil[i]t[ar]y foresight or pre-science or great powers of deduction," that he was "not very fertile in resources or expedients," that he was "perhaps a little too cautious in civil as well as Mil[i]t[ar]y matters," and that he was incapable "of much generous friendship."

Lee, probably wisely, took his opinion of Beauregard to the grave except to the extent that it can be inferred from Lee's actions.

The first person to comment on this blog post at my new blog address (johnhorncivilwarauthor.blogspot.com) is entitled to a free copy of my book, The Siege of Petersburg:  The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2015).  

Watch Out For Timepieces (adapted from my forthcoming book, "Grant Lays Siege to Lee: Petersburg, June 18-July 1, 1864")

Conparing the position of the sun with the results of timepieces on June 22, 1864, when Confederates of Hill's Corps at Petersburg inflicted the first of a pair of humiliations on the crack Federal II Corps, indicates the timepieces may have been slow by up to an hour.  Four guns and more than 1,500 prisoners were captured.

Timepieces say the morning advance of Gibbon's division of II Corps into its forward line facing the Petersburg fortifications took place at 2:00 a.m.  The sun says at least 3:00 a.m.

Map by Hal Jespersen

Captain John R. Breitenbach of the 106th Pennsylvania in O'Brien's brigade of Gibbon's division said the 106th moved into the advanced breastworks constructed during the night of June 21-22 “at early dawn.” OR 40, 1:386.  Corporal Daniel Bond of the 1st Minnesota Battalion in Pierce's brigade of Gibbon's division wrote, “About daylight four pieces of artillery were brought up and took position on the left of our battalion and between it and the third [O'Brien's] brigade,”  Daniel Bond Diary and Memoir, Newberry Library, Chicago, IL, June 22, 1864, 234.  Early dawn could not have been before 2:59 a.m., the beginning of astronomical twilight, the darkest phase of twilight; daylight could have been as late as from 4:22 a.m., civil twilight, until sunrise at 4:53 a.m.  timeanddate.com/sun/@4778642? month=6&year =1864; odysseymagazine.com/astronomical-twilight/  

Timepieces say the last counterattack of Gibbon's division took place at 7:00 p.m.  The sun says around 8:00 p.m.

Map by Hal Jespersen

Brigadier General William Mahone of Hill's Corps at “7:20 p.m.” reported that by then he had fought off the two Federal counterattacks and that Wilcox's division had arrived behind him.  OR 51, 2:1026.  Major General Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox of Hill's Corps says his division reached Mahone “after sundown.”  Wilcox Report, Lee Headquarters Papers.  Sundown was at 7:37 p.m.  timeanddate.com/sun/@4778642month+6&year=1864  Private T. V. Methvin in Wright's Georgia Brigade of Mahone's division begins his account of the second Federal counterattack, “We held them until eight o’clock that night, but just after the sun went down we got orders for four men from each company to go to the front and locate the enemy.”  T. V. Methvin, “In the Wilderness Campaign,” Confederate Veteran (CV) 23:455.  Corps commander Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell Hill says the second Federal counterattack occurred “at dark.”  OR 51, 2:1026.  By “dark,” he probably meant the beginning of nautical twilight, during which it is too dark to see objects in the distance easily, but one can still see the horizon and trees in the distance due to the remaining brightness in the night sky.  odysseymagazine.com/astronomical-twilight/  Nautical twilight began at 8.08 p.m.  timeanddate.com/sun/@4778642month +6&year=1864  Corporal John J. Sherman of Gibbon's division indicates the attack ended before dark, recalling, “As soon as it became dark the brigade commenced to fall back.”  Letter, John J. Sherman to “Dear Mother,” June 24, 1864, Eighth New York Heavy Artillery Collection, Genesee County History Department, Batavia, NY.  By “dark,” he probably meant the end of nautical twilight and the beginning of astronomical twilight, when there are no traces of glow and light in the sky.  odysseymagazine .com/astronomical-twilight/  Astronomical twilight began at 8:46 p.m.  timeanddate .com/sun/@ 4778642month+6&year=1864  The aforesaid sources thus suggest that the second Federal counterattack went in about 8:00 p.m.

During the middle of the day, the sun was not near enough the horizon to provide much of a check at all on timepieces.