The Limits of Grant's Nerve

The Limits of Grant's Nerve,

as Demonstrated in the Period About Which I Am Writing in My Current Book,

Grant Begins His Siege of Lee: Petersburg, June 18-July 1, 1864

Grant was one of our greatest generals, but so was Lee.  Grant was a bold general, but his nerve had its limits, and he displayed them during the siege of Petersburg.  At the beginning of the siege, when he outnumbered Lee two to one, Grant declined to cut loose from his base at Bermuda Hundred as Warren suggested on June 23 to cut Lee's communications, in a move similar to the one Sherman made at Atlanta to cut Hood's last rail line and force the evacuation of that city.  

Two divisions of Confederates had just trounced the Army of the Potomac's II and VI orps on June 22, inflicting about 2,500 casualties at a cost of around 600 to the Rebels.  Warren suggested to Meade on the afternoon June 23 that the Army of the Potomac abandon its lines, send its wagons to the Army of the James in Bermuda Hundred, and set out for the Weldon Railroad with six days’ rations.  Meade passed this idea along to Grant after objecting because it would invite Lee to interpose between the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James, cutting off the former from supplies.  Grant criticized Warren’s plan as insufficiently bold.  “I would not think of moving the whole of your command with less than ten days’ rations, and then it would be to turn the enemy’s right, cross the Appomattox, and force a connection with Butler between Richmond and Petersburg,” the general-in-chief wrote to Meade.  Later the same afternoon, instead of implementing his improvement on Warren's plan, Grant directed Butler to stretch to his left and by morning relieve the right division of IX Corps.  Meanwhile, Warren acknowledged to Meade the risks and objections involved, but observed that the Army of the Potomac could turn about and fight in case the Confederates interposed between it and the Army of the James.  Warren urged "some decisive movement, in which, throwing all our weight into the battle, we are willing to run the risk of losing all by a failure--fight the Wilderness battle again."

On June 28, while Federal troops at Petersburg rested, Grant still contemplated taking the Army of the Potomac with ten days rations to the Appomattox above Petersburg and from there either attacking the Cockade City from that side or crossing the Appomattox and striking the Howlett Line from behind.  Ultimately, the general-in-chief lacked the nerve for such a plan.  He did not dare make such a risky move against Lee, who had contested practically every foot of ground from the Rapidan to the James.  Even at the end of the Petersburg siege, again outnumbering Lee two to one, Grant still declined to cut loose from his base but stretched out to his left a corps at a time and finally overwhelmed Lee by direct assault.

Map by Hal Jespersen

Grant and Lee had undergone attitude adjustments during the Overland Campaign.  They behaved more cautiously during the siege than before they had joined battle.  Each entered the Overland Campaign considering the other overrated.  By deceiving Lee at the Mule Shoe and during the crossing of James River, Grant convinced the Southern chieftain that he finally faced a foe whose movements he could not predict.  Lee entered Petersburg on June 18 in such a state that he uncharacteristically declined to counterattack the Union left on the spot as Beauregard suggested.  On the other hand, the Virginia general by contesting almost every inch of ground from the Rapidan to the James, disabused the Federal general-in-chief of the idea that he might maneuver with impunity.  Grant never cut loose from the City Point bridgehead with the Army of the Potomac to sever Lee’s communications as Warren suggested and the general-in-chief contemplated.  Sherman did cut loose from his Chattahoochee bridgehead at Atlanta, but he did not face Robert E. Lee.