The Limits of Grant's Nerve

The Limits of Grant's Nerve,

as Demonstrated in the Period About Which I Am Writing in My Current Book,

Grant Begins His Siege of Lee: Petersburg, June 18-July 1, 1864

Grant was one of our greatest generals, but so was Lee.  Grant was a bold general, but his nerve had its limits, and he displayed them during the siege of Petersburg.  At the beginning of the siege, when he outnumbered Lee two to one, Grant declined to cut loose from his base at Bermuda Hundred as Warren suggested on June 23 to cut Lee's communications, in a move similar to the one Sherman made at Atlanta to cut Hood's last rail line and force the evacuation of that city.  

Two divisions of Confederates had just trounced the Army of the Potomac's II and VI orps on June 22, inflicting about 2,500 casualties at a cost of around 600 to the Rebels.  Warren suggested to Meade on the afternoon June 23 that the Army of the Potomac abandon its lines, send its wagons to the Army of the James in Bermuda Hundred, and set out for the Weldon Railroad with six days’ rations.  Meade passed this idea along to Grant after objecting because it would invite Lee to interpose between the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James, cutting off the former from supplies.  Grant criticized Warren’s plan as insufficiently bold.  “I would not think of moving the whole of your command with less than ten days’ rations, and then it would be to turn the enemy’s right, cross the Appomattox, and force a connection with Butler between Richmond and Petersburg,” the general-in-chief wrote to Meade.  Later the same afternoon, instead of implementing his improvement on Warren's plan, Grant directed Butler to stretch to his left and by morning relieve the right division of IX Corps.  Meanwhile, Warren acknowledged to Meade the risks and objections involved, but observed that the Army of the Potomac could turn about and fight in case the Confederates interposed between it and the Army of the James.  Warren urged "some decisive movement, in which, throwing all our weight into the battle, we are willing to run the risk of losing all by a failure--fight the Wilderness battle again."

On June 28, while Federal troops at Petersburg rested, Grant still contemplated taking the Army of the Potomac with ten days rations to the Appomattox above Petersburg and from there either attacking the Cockade City from that side or crossing the Appomattox and striking the Howlett Line from behind.  Ultimately, the general-in-chief lacked the nerve for such a plan.  He did not dare make such a risky move against Lee, who had contested practically every foot of ground from the Rapidan to the James.  Even at the end of the Petersburg siege, again outnumbering Lee two to one, Grant still declined to cut loose from his base but stretched out to his left a corps at a time and finally overwhelmed Lee by direct assault.

Map by Hal Jespersen

Grant and Lee had undergone attitude adjustments during the Overland Campaign.  They behaved more cautiously during the siege than before they had joined battle.  Each entered the Overland Campaign considering the other overrated.  By deceiving Lee at the Mule Shoe and during the crossing of James River, Grant convinced the Southern chieftain that he finally faced a foe whose movements he could not predict.  Lee entered Petersburg on June 18 in such a state that he uncharacteristically declined to counterattack the Union left on the spot as Beauregard suggested.  On the other hand, the Virginia general by contesting almost every inch of ground from the Rapidan to the James, disabused the Federal general-in-chief of the idea that he might maneuver with impunity.  Grant never cut loose from the City Point bridgehead with the Army of the Potomac to sever Lee’s communications as Warren suggested and the general-in-chief contemplated.  Sherman did cut loose from his Chattahoochee bridgehead at Atlanta, but he did not face Robert E. Lee.

Beauregard and Lee

Friends, forgive me; I had to tweak my blog address once more to conform with my blog's new title and description.  The new blog address is johnhorncivilwarauthor.blogspot.com

Beauregard and Lee

Robert E. Lee, a Virginian, graduated second in the West Point class of 1829.  

Pierre Gustave Toutant "Gus" Beauregard, a Louisianan who as an adult did not use his first name but styled himself "G. T. Beauregard," graduated second in the West Point class of 1838.  

Both served in the United States Army as engineers.  Both served with distinction in the Mexican War.  

Lee distinguished himself as one of the chief aides to his fellow Virginian, Major General Winfield Scott, during the march from Vera Cruz to Mexico City.  Lee's personal reconnaissances contributed to American victories by finding routes of attack undefended by the Mexicans because the terrain appeared impassable.  He fought at Cerro Gordo, Contreras, Cherubusco, and Chapultepec, where he was wounded.  He was breveted major, lieutenant colonel and colonel.

Map of August 18, 1864, by Hampton Newsome, from John Horn, The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2015)

Beauregard served as an engineer on Scott's staff.  He fought at Contreras, Cherubusco and Chapultepec, where he was wounded in two places.  He too carried out reconnaissances.  He also persuaded his superiors to attack the fortress of Chapultepec differently than they had planned.  He was breveted captain and major.

Gus felt slighted, but not with respect to Lee.  Beauregard considered his contributions to victory more significant than those of other officers who received more brevets than he, but not more significant than Lee's contributions.

Both Lee and Beauregard were appointed Superintendent of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point.  

Lee served from 1852 until 1855, when he became lieutenant colonel of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Texas.

Around that time Beauregard exhibited dubious judgment in considering a post filibustering in Nicaragua with William Walker, who had taken control of that country.  Fortunately for Gus, Scott talked him out of the enterprise.  Walker was soon forced to resign the presidency of Nicaragua.

Beauregard was appointed Superintendent of the Military Academy on January 23, 1861.  He relinquished the office after five days because the Federal government revoked his orders as soon as Louisiana seceded.

Both Beauregard and Lee numbered among the Confederacy's five first full generals.  Beauregard ranked fifth, Lee third.

Shortly before First Manassas, Lee participated in the rejection of a complicated, highly optimistic plan of the sort that became typical of Beauregard.

Gus met with success first.  He participated in the victory at First Manassas on July 21, 1861.  Lee met with defeat in a campaign in western Virginia.

Map of August 19, 1864, by Hampton Newsome, from John Horn, The Siege of Petersburg; The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatue, 2015)

Beauregard exhibited a quarrelsome nature.  He contended with the Commissary General, the Secretary of War and finally President Davis.  A political liability, he was packed off to serve as second-in-command to General Albert Sidney Johnston.

Beauregard subsequently rose to command the Army of Tennessee after the death of Johnston at the battle of Shiloh.  Lee soon afterward was appointed to command what became the Army of Northern Virginia after the wounding of General Joseph Eggleston Johnston.  

Lee's star was on the rise, Beauregard's on the wane.  Gus was relieved of command of the Army of Tennessee when he clumsily took sick leave after the fall of Corinth, Mississippi.  Davis packed him off to Charleston, South Carolina.

After Chancellorsville, Lee urged Davis to bring Beauregard and most of his troops up to Virginia from the south Atlantic coast.  While Lee raided Pennsylvania, Beauregard would menace Washington, D.C. and lighten the pressure on Lee.  Gus, who had already dispatched 5,000 men to the attempted relief of Vicksburg, thought the departure of more would invite an enemy attack.

In the last month of 1863, Lee recommended that Davis appoint Beauregard commander of the Army of Tennessee.  Beauregard, among many others, suggested Johnston.  Davis, who seems to have really wanted Lee for the post, appointed Johnston. 

The first real friction between Beauregard and Lee developed in May and June 1864.  The two vied for troops and the Davis administration usually backed Lee.  Grant's crossing of the James intensified the friction between the two Confederate generals.  Some hard feelings developed between the two.

When Johnston was removed from the command of the Army of Tennessee in July 1864, Beauregard hoped to replace him.  Lee did not recommend Beauregard to Davis as a possible replacement for Johnston.  This does not appear to have arisen from the hard feelings between Gus and Lee, but from the urgency of replacing Johnston; Sherman was at the gates of Atlanta by the time Davis sacked Old Joe.  By that time, the replacement had to come from within the Army of Tennessee.  In any event, Davis would never have appointed Beauregard commander of the Army of Tennessee at this point because the president appears to have been dissatisfied with Beaurgard's performance in May and June if sniping at the Louisianian by Davis' military advisor Gen. Braxton Bragg was any indication.  Bragg complained about Beauregard's abandonment of the Howlett Line opposite Bermuda Hundred in order to concentrate on the defense of Petersburg.

Beauregard did not serve Lee at Petersburg as Gus had served Joe Johnston at First Manassas and Albert Sydney Johnston at Shiloh.  Beauregard had done the planning and fighting at those two battles.  At Petersburg, Gus commanded when Lee was north of the James but reverted to command of his own troops, essentially a corps, in Lee's presence.  Lee, who had written off the Weldon Railroad as indefensible upon arriving in Petersburg in June, refused to join the Davis administration in nit-picking Beauregard for the loss of the railway in August.  Gus actually performed better than Lee in the August fighting around Petersburg, counterattacking with what he had before the Federals could dig in (August 18 and 19) rather than waiting like Lee for set piece engagements while the enemy entrenched (August 21).  Beauregard blamed the Davis administration rather than Lee for not giving Gus command of the Confederate forces gathering around Early's Corps in the lower Shenandoah Valley.

Map of August 21, 1864, by Hampton Newsome, from John Horn, The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2015)

In September Lee encouraged Beauregard to leave Petersburg and take command at Wilmington, North Carolina or Charleston.  In the aftermath of Atlanta's fall, Gus hoped for command of the Army of Tennessee but was given an empty command overseeing that army.  

By February 1865, Lee had become general-in-chief of the Confederate States Army.  Unable to understand how Sherman could advance without orthodox supply lines, Lee became dissatisfied with Beauregard's inability to stop Sherman's advance northward from Savannah.  The general-in-chief removed Beaurgard and replaced him with Johnston, who brought Sherman to battle at Bentonville in March but did not stop his progress north.

After the war Beauregard praised Lee for "great nerve, coolness, & determination--the greater the danger the greater was his presence of mind" and his noble & high toned character."  Gus also criticised Lee, writing that Lee did not have "much Mil[i]t[ar]y foresight or pre-science or great powers of deduction," that he was "not very fertile in resources or expedients," that he was "perhaps a little too cautious in civil as well as Mil[i]t[ar]y matters," and that he was incapable "of much generous friendship."

Lee, probably wisely, took his opinion of Beauregard to the grave except to the extent that it can be inferred from Lee's actions.

The first person to comment on this blog post at my new blog address (johnhorncivilwarauthor.blogspot.com) is entitled to a free copy of my book, The Siege of Petersburg:  The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2015).  

Watch Out For Timepieces (adapted from my forthcoming book, "Grant Lays Siege to Lee: Petersburg, June 18-July 1, 1864")

Conparing the position of the sun with the results of timepieces on June 22, 1864, when Confederates of Hill's Corps at Petersburg inflicted the first of a pair of humiliations on the crack Federal II Corps, indicates the timepieces may have been slow by up to an hour.  Four guns and more than 1,500 prisoners were captured.

Timepieces say the morning advance of Gibbon's division of II Corps into its forward line facing the Petersburg fortifications took place at 2:00 a.m.  The sun says at least 3:00 a.m.

Map by Hal Jespersen

Captain John R. Breitenbach of the 106th Pennsylvania in O'Brien's brigade of Gibbon's division said the 106th moved into the advanced breastworks constructed during the night of June 21-22 “at early dawn.” OR 40, 1:386.  Corporal Daniel Bond of the 1st Minnesota Battalion in Pierce's brigade of Gibbon's division wrote, “About daylight four pieces of artillery were brought up and took position on the left of our battalion and between it and the third [O'Brien's] brigade,”  Daniel Bond Diary and Memoir, Newberry Library, Chicago, IL, June 22, 1864, 234.  Early dawn could not have been before 2:59 a.m., the beginning of astronomical twilight, the darkest phase of twilight; daylight could have been as late as from 4:22 a.m., civil twilight, until sunrise at 4:53 a.m.  timeanddate.com/sun/@4778642? month=6&year =1864; odysseymagazine.com/astronomical-twilight/  

Timepieces say the last counterattack of Gibbon's division took place at 7:00 p.m.  The sun says around 8:00 p.m.

Map by Hal Jespersen

Brigadier General William Mahone of Hill's Corps at “7:20 p.m.” reported that by then he had fought off the two Federal counterattacks and that Wilcox's division had arrived behind him.  OR 51, 2:1026.  Major General Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox of Hill's Corps says his division reached Mahone “after sundown.”  Wilcox Report, Lee Headquarters Papers.  Sundown was at 7:37 p.m.  timeanddate.com/sun/@4778642month+6&year=1864  Private T. V. Methvin in Wright's Georgia Brigade of Mahone's division begins his account of the second Federal counterattack, “We held them until eight o’clock that night, but just after the sun went down we got orders for four men from each company to go to the front and locate the enemy.”  T. V. Methvin, “In the Wilderness Campaign,” Confederate Veteran (CV) 23:455.  Corps commander Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell Hill says the second Federal counterattack occurred “at dark.”  OR 51, 2:1026.  By “dark,” he probably meant the beginning of nautical twilight, during which it is too dark to see objects in the distance easily, but one can still see the horizon and trees in the distance due to the remaining brightness in the night sky.  odysseymagazine.com/astronomical-twilight/  Nautical twilight began at 8.08 p.m.  timeanddate.com/sun/@4778642month +6&year=1864  Corporal John J. Sherman of Gibbon's division indicates the attack ended before dark, recalling, “As soon as it became dark the brigade commenced to fall back.”  Letter, John J. Sherman to “Dear Mother,” June 24, 1864, Eighth New York Heavy Artillery Collection, Genesee County History Department, Batavia, NY.  By “dark,” he probably meant the end of nautical twilight and the beginning of astronomical twilight, when there are no traces of glow and light in the sky.  odysseymagazine .com/astronomical-twilight/  Astronomical twilight began at 8:46 p.m.  timeanddate .com/sun/@ 4778642month+6&year=1864  The aforesaid sources thus suggest that the second Federal counterattack went in about 8:00 p.m.

During the middle of the day, the sun was not near enough the horizon to provide much of a check at all on timepieces.

Crater Road Detour for December 26 Tour of Petersburg Battlefields

There's construction on Crater Road and this detour will be necessary to negotiate it on my December 26 tour of the three Petersburg battlefields of the Crater (July 30, 1864), Jerusalem Plank Road (June 21, 1864) and Globe Tavern (August 18-21, 1864).  George Fickett has volunteered to lead us through this maze.

Map courtesy of George Fickett

Yes, There Will Be a Free Tour of Three Petersburg Battlefields December 26, 2022

On December 26, 2022, I'll lead a free tour of three Petersburg battlefields.  The tour will start from the parking lot outside the main visitor center at 10:00 a.m. that day.  The park will be open.  Maps should be available at the visitor center.  My hat will identify me.

John Horn

We'll go first to the Crater, the nearest battlefield.  I'll focus on the role in this bloody fight (July 30, 1864) of the 12th Virginia Infantry, the Petersburg Regiment.  I depicted that role in The Petersburg Regiment in the Civil War:  A History of the 12th Virginia Infantry from John Brown's Hanging to Appomattox, 1859-1865 (Savas Beatie, 2019), which won the 2019 Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award for Unit History.  Both sides called for no quarter in that battle.

Map by Hampton Newsome

Next, we'll drive down Crater Road to Flank Road, turn right and follow Birdsong Road to its junction with the old Johnson Road, where Brig. Gen. Rufus Clay "Aunt Nancy" Barringer and his North Carolina Brigade of Cavalry ambushed and defeated Brig. Gen. Francis Channing Barlow's Red Club Division of II Corps, one of the toughest divisions in the United States Army on June 21, 1864, the first day of the battle of Jerusalem Plank Road.  I've written of that fight in my virtually completed Grant Besieges Lee at Petersburg:  The Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road and the Wilson-Kautz Raid, June 20-July 1, 1864.  The Petersburg Regiment became involved in the battle on June 22 and June 23 as the Federal attempt to invest Petersburg from Jerusalem Plank Road to the Appomattox River above the City went from one disaster to another. 

Map of Birney's Advance, June 21, 1864, by Hal Jespersen

The battle of Globe Tavern took place in the same area August 18-21, 1864.  We'll discuss that battle, which I covered in The Siege of Petersburg:  The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (Savas Beatie, 2015) (sesquicentennial edition originally published as The Destruction of the Weldon Railroad (H. E. Howard, Inc., 1991).  The focus will be on the Petersburg Regiment, which on August 19 narrowly avoided on the calamity which befell Hagood's brigade on August 21.

Map by Hampton Newsome

Afterward we'll head back to the visitor center where anyone who wants to buy a book should be able to do so.  I'll hang around to inscribe books and answer questions before I return to Richmond for dinner with relatives.

Map by Hampton Newsome

Free Tour of Petersburg Battlefields December 26, 2022?

Would anyone be interested in a free tour of the Petersburg battlefields on the morning of December 26, 2022?  I'll conduct such a tour if there's sufficient interest.

I've written a few books on the siege and I plan to be in Richmond then.

My books include The Petersburg Campaign (1993); The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (2015); and The Petersburg Regiment (2019).  The last won the 2019 Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award for Unit History.

The working title of my nearly finished current project is Grant's Siege of Lee at Petersburg:  The Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road and the Wilson-Kautz Raid.

My idea is to begin in the main vistor center parking lot of Petersburg National Battlefield Park, proceed to the Crater battlefield (July 30, 1864), then down Crater Road to Birdsong Road and take up the route of Barlow's division to its ambush at the hands of Barringer's cavalry brigade on the Jerusalem Plank Road battlefield (June 21-24, 1864) , and wind up on the Globe Tavern battlefield (August 18-21, 1864 at the monument to Hagood's South Carolina Brigade at Stop One of the Petersburg National Battlefield Western Front Auto Tour on the west side of Halifax Road south of Flank Road.  We would then return to the visitor center so nobody gets lost and I could inscribe any book anyone wants to purchase there.

Those interested in the proposed tour should contact me by email (johnedwardhorn@gmail.com), facebook, or my blog at petersburgcampaign.blogspot.com.

I hope you all had a Happy Thanksgiving!

John Horn

More on the Possibility of Beauregard as Commander of the Army of Tennessee in 1864

On December 3, 1863, Gen. Robert E. Lee recommended that President Jefferson F. Davis appoint Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard commander of the Army of Tennessee.  OR 29, 2:859.  Lieutenant General James Longstreet, Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, former Army of Tennessee chief of staff Brig. Gen. William W. Mackall and  Beauregard himself urged, and the general public demanded, however, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's appointment.  "To these appeals Davis, much against his inclination, yielded and appointed Johnston to the command of the army."  Elsworth Eliot, Jr., West Point in the Confederacy, 184.  (Davis's inclination seems to have been General Lee, who appears to have talked the president out of it.  OR 29, 2:861.)  On December 8, the Richmond Whig advocated the appointment of either Beauregard or Johnston.  When Johnston was appointed, Beauregard congratulated him.  Eliot, West Point in the Confederacy, 184.   

 

Jefferson F. Davis

           Library of Congress 

Choosing a commander of the Army of Tennessee was difficult enough for Davis once Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee declined to take command in late 1863.  Replacing Johnston once his unacceptable performance became intolerable during the 1864 Atlanta Campaign may well have been just as difficult.

Richard M. McMurry goes into this more thoroughly in Atlanta 1864 than Albert E. Castel in Decision in the West.  Dissatisfaction with Johnston's performance began to voice itself as early as May.  On June 24, Johnston's friend Senator Louis Wigfall visited Johnston and informed him that Davis was considering replacing him with Lt. Gen.  John Bell Hood.  

By this time, Beauregard had demonstrated his superiority to Johnston by defeating Butler at Second Drewry's Bluff (May 16) and Grant at Second Petersburg (June 15-18).  One might naturally ask why Davis was not considering Beauregard as well as Hood.  When Johnston was removed in July 1864, Beauregard hoped to take command of the Army of Tennessee.  T. Harry Williams, P. G. T. Beauregard, Napoleon in Gray, 239.  

There are at least two reasons why Davis did not consider Beauregard as a replacement for Johnston.

First, Davis appears to have been dissatisfied with Beaurgard's performance in May and June if sniping at the Louisianian by Davis' military advisor Gen. Braxton Bragg was any indication.  Bragg complained about Beauregard's abandonment of the Howlett Line opposite Bermuda Hundred in order to concentrate on the defense of Petersburg.

Second, Hood was with the Army of Tennessee while Beauregard was hundreds of miles and several days away; Hood could step into Johnston's shoes much more easily than the Louisianian.  Davis did not remove Johnston until July 17.  At that point, only Hardee and Hood were under consideration to replace Johnston.  The Federals were at the gates of Atlanta.  Beauregard could not have arrived in time to take command before action had to be taken against them.  Lee thought the pressing circumstances required the appoitment of someone with the Army of Tennessee such as Hood or Hardee and Lee seems to have leaned toward Hardee.  Lee did not mention Beauregard in recommending a replacement for Johnston.  Castel, Decision in the West, 353.

Beauregard and his partisans were disappointed when command of the Army of Tennessee was given to Hood.  It's hard to imagine that Beauregard or Lee would not have defended Atlanta more effectively than Hood.  Beauregard and Lee reacted immediately to movements against their flanks (June 21-23, August 18-21).  Hood neglected to block the Federals till they were within a mile of his last railroad, forcing him to attack them in entrenchments.